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THE SPORT OF CYBERSECURITY: HOW 
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES CAN 
BETTER PROTECT THE COMPETITIVE 
INTEGRITY OF THEIR GAMES 
NATHANIEL GROW* 
SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD** 
Abstract: From a Major League Baseball scouting director using a cyberattack to 
break into a competitor’s records, to an NBA franchise being compromised in a 
phishing scheme, U.S. professional sports leagues are waking up to the fact that 
cybersecurity is no longer just a problem for the government or tech firms—it has 
now reached into the playing field, locker room, and boardroom. This Article 
breaks new ground by examining how the four major U.S. professional sports 
leagues—Major League Baseball, the National Football League, the National Bas-
ketball Association, and the National Hockey League—are protecting themselves 
from these cyber risks that threaten the competitive integrity of their games, and 
proposes ways in which the leagues could do more to proactively mitigate their 
cyber risk. 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario—there is less than a minute left in Super 
Bowl LV, and the New England Patriots are leading the Dallas Cowboys 24-
20. The Cowboys are making a final drive that could win them the game, but 
face a fourth-down play needing to gain eight yards to score the go-ahead 
touchdown. During their final timeout, the Cowboys coaching staff use their 
league-sanctioned tablet computers to access the team playbook, and select a 
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shotgun formation.1 The Patriots are well prepared for the play, though, result-
ing in a quick sack of the quarterback. As a result, New England once again 
wins the Super Bowl championship. 
Controversy ensues during a subsequent investigation when the National 
Football League (NFL) discovers that an insider threat from the Cowboys’ 
staff gave the Patriots access to the teams’ internal systems, and allowed the 
Patriots to monitor Dallas’ tablet computers in order to discover which play the 
Cowboys would be calling. Perhaps most surprisingly of all, the public is 
shocked to discover that such blatantly anticompetitive conduct is not directly 
regulated under any current NFL rule. 
From the scouting director for a Major League Baseball (MLB) team us-
ing a cyberattack to break into a competitor’s records,2 to a National Basket-
ball Association (NBA) franchise being compromised in a phishing scheme,3 
U.S. professional sports leagues are waking up to the fact that cybersecurity is 
no longer just a problem for governments or tech firms—it has now reached 
into the playing field, locker room, and boardroom.4 Unfortunately, the 
leagues’ efforts to safeguard the competitive integrity of their sporting compe-
tition from these threats have been relatively slow to develop. Rather than for-
mulate league-wide cybersecurity standards, U.S. leagues appear to largely 
defer to their teams to protect themselves from cyber intrusions.5 Meanwhile, 
the leagues have also failed to enact specific rules to deter their teams from 
targeting one another in cyberattacks.6 At the same time, the existing academic 
literature has completely overlooked the industry, and failed to analyze the 
unique cyber risks that these high-visibility leagues and franchises face. 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Kyle Stack, For NFL Teams, iPad Is Valuable Playbook, WIRED (Dec. 14, 2011), https://
www.wired.com/2011/12/nfl-teams-gameplan-with-ipads/ [https://perma.cc/4PUD-CNFY] (discuss-
ing NFL teams’ increased reliance on tablet computers). 
 2 See infra notes 179–187 and accompanying text (discussing the hacking of the Houston Astros 
by a former employee of the St. Louis Cardinals). 
 3 See Jon Fingas, The Milwaukee Bucks Fell Prey to a Phishing Email Scam, ENGADGET (May 
21, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/05/21/milwaukee-bucks-fall-to-phishing-scam/ [https://
perma.cc/6K43-ZRGN] (reporting that the NBA’s Milwaukee Bucks “fell victim to a phishing scam 
that compromised the basketball team’s financial data”). 
 4 See, e.g., Chris Bing, There’s Now a Cybersecurity Organization Dedicated to U.S. Sports, 
FEDSCOOP (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.fedscoop.com/sports-isao-cybersecurity-2016/ [https://
perma.cc/YZ7U-Z5UB] (discussing the formation of an information sharing and analysis organization 
(ISAO) focused on “sports-related digital assets”). 
 5 See Bill Shaikin, Angels, Dodgers Are Responsible for Their Own Cyber Security, L.A. TIMES 
(June 16, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-baseball-security-20150617-story.html [https://
perma.cc/H2V6-6THJ] (reporting that in MLB, “each team is responsible for its own cyber security, 
but MLB employs experts and makes them available to consult with teams”); see also infra note 143 
and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 94–141 and accompanying text (noting the relative dearth of cybersecurity-
related rules and regulations promulgated by the four major U.S. professional sports leagues). That 
said, the Cyber Resilience Institute recently established a Sports ISAO to attempt to address cyberse-
curity risks in this area. See Bing, supra note 4 (discussing the initiative). 
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This Article breaks new ground by both identifying the numerous poten-
tial competition-related cybersecurity risks the four major U.S. professional 
sports leagues—MLB, the NFL, the NBA, and the National Hockey League 
(NHL)—currently face, and assessing the current steps that the leagues are 
taking to safeguard themselves from these dangers. Ultimately, this Article 
proposes ways in which the leagues can better protect the competitive integrity 
of their games in order to proactively ward off worst-case scenarios along the 
lines of the hypothetical offered above. 
The Article is structured as follows. Part I introduces the range of cyber 
threats pertinent to U.S. professional sports leagues with a focus on Internet of 
Things (IoT) security and critical infrastructure protection.7 Part II surveys the 
existing U.S. legal regime regulating cybersecurity, including most prominent-
ly the law of trade secrecy.8 Part III examines potential competition-related 
cyber risks already manifest in the U.S. professional team sports industry, in-
cluding the manipulation of in-game technology, shared data, proprietary data-
bases, and biometric-tracking devices, along with gambling-related concerns.9 
Part IV summarizes the leagues’ existing frameworks to help mitigate these 
cyber risks.10 Part V identifies potential shortcomings in the leagues’ current 
approach to cybersecurity issues and proposes measures the leagues could 
adopt to better protect the competitive integrity of their competitions from fu-
ture cyberattack.11 
I. INTRODUCING THE MULTIFACETED CYBER THREAT 
It is no secret that the cost of cyberattacks on both the public and private 
sectors is mounting.12 According to a 2018 National Bureau of Economic Re-
search report, for example, large companies that are victims of a cyberattack in 
which customers’ personal data are compromised realize an approximately 1.1 
percent loss in market value and a 3.4 percentage point drop in sales growth.13 
These statistics are sobering, given the prevalence of cyberattackers success-
fully penetrating even the most guarded corporate networks. One recent exam-
ple of this all too familiar phenomenon was the alleged Chinese government 
hacking of a U.S. Navy contractor charged with developing a top-secret super-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See infra notes 12–39 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 40–93 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 94–141 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 142–212 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 213–271 and accompanying text. 
 12 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, RATs, TRAPs, and Trade Secrets, 57 B.C. L. REV. 381, 384 (2016) 
(noting “[c]yber criminals have stolen up to $1 trillion worth of intellectual property in a single year”). 
 13 Shinichi Kamiya et al., What Is the Impact of Successful Cyberattacks on Target Firms?, 1, 4, 
25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24409, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/
w24409.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WQY-SQZK]. 
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sonic missile.14 In fact, one leading cybersecurity scholar has reported that 
“[n]inety-seven percent of Fortune 500 companies have been hacked . . . and 
likely the other [three] percent have too, they just don’t know it.”15 Three 
trends in particular are making it much more difficult for organizations of all 
sizes to mitigate the array of cyber risks they face: (1) the evolution of the “In-
ternet of Everything”; (2) the difficulty of protecting trade secrets in such an 
interconnected digital ecosystem; and (3) the proliferation of threats to critical 
infrastructure, including public facilities. Each of these trends is analyzed in 
turn to provide context for these debates before focusing in on the specific is-
sues confronting the U.S. professional sports industry. 
A. Exploring the Internet of Everything 
In late 2016, a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, later known as 
the Mirai botnet,16 curtailed internet servers run by a tech firm called Dyn.17 
That, in and of itself, might not have been newsworthy; in fact, botnet-enabled 
DDoS attacks are now commonplace.18 Nevertheless, the Mirai botnet was 
noteworthy, given the havoc it wrought by slowing, and in some cases stop-
ping, internet services for much of the eastern United States.19 The Mirai bot-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See China Hackers Steal Data from US Navy Contractor—Reports, BBC (June 9, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44421785 [https://perma.cc/S2UY-R9KE]. 
 15 All Fortune 500 Companies Have Been Hacked: 97% Know It, the Other 3% Don’t, HOME-
LAND SECURITY NEWS WIRE (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/srcyber
security20140108-all-fortune-500-companies-have-been-hacked-97-know-it-the-other-3-don-t [https://
perma.cc/XA98-TP4S]. 
 16 See Theresa E. Miedema, Engaging Consumers in Cyber Security, 21 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 
(2018) (describing how “the Mirai botnet . . . perpetrated one of the largest DDOS attacks in history in 
September 2016”); Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr., After the Gold Rush: The Boom of the Internet of 
Things, and the Busts of Data-Security and Privacy, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
69, 99 (2017) (“In September and October 2016, DDoS attacks on several IoT devices used the infa-
mous Mirai botnet.”); see also Neena Kapur, The Rise of IoT Botnets, AM. SECURITY PROJECT (Jan. 
13, 2017), https://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-rise-of-iot-botnets/ [https://perma.cc/4HJJ-
M4BT] (“A bot is defined as a computer or internet-connected device that is infected with malware 
and controlled by a central command-and-control (C2) server. A botnet is the term used for all devices 
controlled by the C2 server, and they can be used to carry out large scale distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks against websites, resulting in an overload of traffic on the website that renders it unus-
able.”). See generally Scott J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters Attack: A Polycentric Approach to 
Enhancing the “Security of Things,” 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415 (introducing cybersecurity governance 
issues in the IoT context). 
 17 Nicky Woolf, DDoS Attack That Disrupted Internet Was Largest of Its Kind in History, Experts 
Say, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/26/ddos-
attack-dyn-mirai-botnet [https://perma.cc/7LZN-V24H]. 
 18 See Ryan Patterson, Silencing the Call to Arms: A Shift Away from Cyber Attacks as Warfare, 
48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 969, 977 n.41 (2015) (describing DDoS attacks as “[a] common cyber attack 
tactic”). 
 19 See Lily Hay Newman, What We Know About Friday’s Massive East Coast Internet Outage, 
WIRED (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/internet-outage-ddos-dns-dyn/ [https://
perma.cc/64XE-DMXP]. 
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net was so successful, and noteworthy, because it took advantage of security 
vulnerabilities in the IoT.20 Initially, some thought that the attack was political-
ly motivated, but investigators determined that it was not, in fact, a shadowy 
group or nation state behind the botnet—instead it was college students, trying 
to get an edge on the video game Minecraft.21 According to one observer, the 
students “didn’t realize the power they were unleashing” and compared their 
actions to the Manhattan Project.22 
Although accounts differ as to the origin of the “Internet of Things,” 
many point to the pivotal role played by Kevin Ashton in popularizing the term 
during a 1999 presentation he gave to Proctor & Gamble.23 But the global push 
to make our businesses, homes, toasters, and even our bodies smarter through 
technology in fact dates back decades.24 For example, in the 1980s, researchers 
at Carnegie-Mellon University installed sensors and switches in a vending ma-
chine to count the number of bottles present and check their temperature.25 By 
the 1990s, despite the rapid scaling of the internet infrastructure, dial-up inter-
net connectivity with relatively slow connection speeds continued to hold back 
the growth of IoT applications, a hurdle that has only been overcome since 
2010 with the advent of faster computers.26 Still, IoT issues are not well under-
                                                                                                                           
 20 See Garrett M. Graff, How a Dorm Room Minecraft Scam Brought Down the Internet, WIRED 
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/mirai-botnet-minecraft-scam-brought-down-the-internet/ 
[https://perma.cc/5NUF-8J7H] (noting the botnet was “powered by unsecured internet-of-things de-
vices like security cameras and wireless routers”); see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: 
What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 341, 348 (discussing changes brought on 
by IoT applications); Brendan Alan Melander, Note, Smart Stadiums: An Illustration of How the “In-
ternet of Things” Is Revolutionizing the World, 6 ARIZ. ST. U. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 349, 350–51 
(2017) (“IoT is a broad array of interconnected devices that use sensors to gather data, share that data 
between devices, and store or evaluate that data. This machine-to-machine (M2M) communication, in 
combination with the sensors, allows for devices that traditionally had no use for the Internet (e.g., 
such as coffee makers, alarm clocks, and refrigerators) to become ‘smart.’”). 
 21 Graff, supra note 20. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID J. (June 22, 2009), https://www.rfid
journal.com/articles/view?4986 [https://perma.cc/2SX2-HQQK]; see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, 
The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 813 (2016) 
(“Technologist Kevin Ashton coined the term ‘the Internet of Things’ in 1998 during a presentation to 
Procter and Gamble when he stated, ‘Adding radio-frequency identification and sensors to everyday 
objects will create an Internet of Things, and lay the foundations of a new age of machine percep-
tion.’”). 
 24 See, e.g., Meghan Neal, The Internet of Bodies Is Coming, and You Could Get Hacked, MOTH-
ERBOARD (Mar. 13, 2014), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gvyqgm/the-internet-of-bodies-
is-coming-and-you-could-get-hacked [https://perma.cc/6CZG-22ZM] (discussing how the next step in 
the evolution of technology could be the computerization of human bodies). 
 25 See John A. Rothchild, Against Notice and Choice: The Manifest Failure of the Proceduralist 
Paradigm to Protect Privacy Online (or Anywhere Else), 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 572 n.61 (2018) 
(noting one of the first IoT devices may have been a Coca-Cola vending machine that was connected 
to Carnegie Mellon University’s computer network in 1982 in order to allow users to check whether 
the machine was stocked and the temperature of the soda bottles). 
 26 See JIM CHASE, TEX. INSTRUMENTS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 1 (2013). 
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stood or appreciated. One 2014 survey, for example, found that eighty-seven 
percent of respondents had never even heard of the “Internet of Things.”27 This 
apathy, though, does not mask the real vulnerabilities that the explosion in 
smart devices creates, which by some estimates could reach 200 billion devic-
es by 2020.28 
IoT vulnerabilities can cause widespread disruptions, such as when they 
are utilized to spread ransomware attacks. This occurred during the WannaCry 
and later NotPetya attacks, which impacted more than 7,000 firms globally and 
cost the shipping giant Maersk more than $200 million.29 These IoT vulnera-
bilities can, in turn, help fuel the theft of invaluable trade secrets, which are the 
lifeblood of major Fortune 500 firms as well as the professional sports indus-
try. Indeed, sports teams are increasingly relying on IoT applications to track 
their players’ movements, training, and dietary regimens.30 
B. Public Facilities and Critical Infrastructure Protection 
The phrase “critical infrastructure” can conjure the most important as-
pects of national life and includes the services on which all of us ultimately 
rely from electricity and water to finance and healthcare.31 As has been argued, 
“[c]ontaminated water sanitation systems may injure thousands before any is-
sue is detected; vulnerable electrical grids may blackout cities; and disrupted 
financial systems may destabilize economies.”32 The United States, and na-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See Chris Merriman, 87 Percent of Consumers Haven’t Heard of the Internet of Things, THE IN-
QUIRER (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2361672/87-percent-of-consumers-
havent-heard-of-the-internet-of-things [https://perma.cc/MF9C-V23Z]. 
 28 See A Guide to the Internet of Things, INTEL, https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/
internet-of-things/infographics/guide-to-iot.html [https://perma.cc/QQQ7-3GEE]. 
 29 See Jill Leovy, Cyberattack Cost Maersk as Much as $300 Million and Disrupted Operations 
for 2 Weeks, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-maersk-cyberattack-
20170817-story.html [https://perma.cc/XL7Q-RY88]; see also Andrew Moshirnia, No Security 
Through Obscurity: Changing Circumvention Law to Protect Our Democracy Against Cyberattacks, 
83 BROOK. L. REV. 1279, 1294 (2018) (“WannaCry ransomware infected roughly a quarter of a mil-
lion machines in 150 countries . . . .”). 
 30 See infra notes 127–133 and accompanying text. 
 31 See Robert Kenneth Palmer, Critical Infrastructure: Legislative Factors for Preventing a 
“Cyber-Pearl Harbor,” 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 289, 293 (2014); Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Net Neutrali-
ty Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, 9 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 4 (2018) 
(describing “critical infrastructure . . . as the energy, water, and communications sectors which are 
foundational to America’s economy and democracy”). 
 32 Scott Shackelford et al., Making Democracy Harder to Hack, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 629, 
634 (2017). An assault on critical infrastructure through cyberattacks has already been dramatized in 
film: 
The 2007 blockbuster [Live Free or Die Hard] dramatized the prospect of a large-scale 
cyber assault: in it, a frustrated former Pentagon insider and a team of hackers inter-
rupted U.S. air traffic control, power, telecommunications, and financial services. Ac-
cording to Richard Clarke, such a scenario is feasible under certain circumstances. 
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tions around the world, have long grappled with the appropriate mix of laws 
and policies to help safeguard vital industries, which the Department of Home-
land Security has defined in the U.S. context to encompass sixteen sectors.33 
These sectors are not fixed. For example, elections were included under the 
public facilities sector in January 2017.34 Professional sports are, in fact, part 
of U.S. critical infrastructure under the “Commercial Facilities Sector,” which 
includes “professional sports leagues and federations” along with operations 
that “draw large crowds” including stadiums and arenas.35 Indeed, there is now 
even an information sharing and analysis organization (ISAO) to help profes-
sional sports leagues pool cybersecurity expertise more effectively, an organi-
zation that mirrors the Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) sys-
tem prevalent across industries from retail to automobiles.36 
Many critical infrastructure sectors in the U.S. boast an array of federal 
and state regulations, given their vital status to national life37—examples range 
from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation standards38 to the 
                                                                                                                           
Id. at 634 n.19; see LIVE FREE OR DIE HARD (Twentieth Century Fox 2007); see also RICHARD A. 
CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 70, 234–35 (2010) (discussing cyber weapons and cyber espionage); Michiko 
Kakutani, The Attack Coming from Bytes, Not Bombs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2010), https://www.
nytimes.com/2010/04/27/books/27book.html [https://perma.cc/5BW3-82JD] (reviewing CLARKE & 
KNAKE, supra). 
 33 See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, PPD-21, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESIL-
IENCE (2013); Supporting Policy and Doctrine, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.
dhs.gov/cisa/supporting-policy-and-doctrine [https://perma.cc/N9MU-BFWC]. The U.S. Cybersecuri-
ty and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which is part of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), identifies sixteen critical infrastructure sectors consistent with Presidential Policy Directive 
21, including: agriculture, banking and finance, chemical, commercial facilities, critical manufactur-
ing, dams, defense industrial base, drinking water and water treatment systems, emergency systems, 
energy, government facilities, information technology, nuclear systems, public health and healthcare, 
telecommunications, and transportation systems. Frequently Asked Questions, CISA, https://ics-
cert.us-cert.gov/Frequently-Asked-Questions [https://perma.cc/99BY-9KLG]. 
 34 Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical 
Infrastructure Subsector, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/
news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical [https://
perma.cc/NDS7-S2BW]. 
 35 Commercial Facilities Sector, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/
commercial-facilities-sector [https://perma.cc/3X5Q-PYDM]. 
 36 See Bing, supra note 4 (discussing the formation of the Sports ISAO). 
 37 See Chris Laughlin, Note, Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructure Sectors: A Proactive Ap-
proach to Ensure Inevitable Laws and Regulations Are Effective, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 345, 355 
(2016) (observing that “‘under current law . . . many [federal agencies] have sector-specific cyberse-
curity responsibilities for critical infrastructure, such as the Department of Transportation for the 
transportation sector’” (quoting ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R42114, FEDERAL LAWS 
RELATING TO CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 4 (2013))). 
 38 See Mandatory Standards Subject to Enforcement, NORTH AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., 
http://www.nerc.net/standardsreports/standardssummary.aspx [https://perma.cc/6EC8-BZJA]. 
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)39—but, as we 
will see below, professional sports leagues have long enjoyed a special status 
in which policymakers have allowed leeway to self-regulate. The question go-
ing forward is whether this should continue in light of the serious cyber risks 
facing these organizations, their players, staffs, and fans. 
II. ANALYZING THE APPLICABLE LEGAL REGIMES PROTECTING  
THE INTEGRITY OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAMS,  
FACILITIES, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Any potential cyber intrusion against a professional sports team operating 
in the United States would potentially run afoul of several existing laws. In 
some cases—such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Eco-
nomic Espionage Act (EEA)—these laws impose potential criminal liability 
against the wrongdoer, while in other cases—including the Uniform Trade Se-
crets Act (UTSA) and the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA)—the victim must 
instead seek civil remedies.40 
A. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Perhaps most significantly, attempts to engage in unauthorized cyber in-
trusions could run afoul of the CFAA.41 The story of the CFAA begins, 
strangely enough, with a blockbuster movie. In 1983, the movie WarGames 
illustrated the potential of hackers to break into the nation’s nuclear arsenal.42 
Reagan Administration officials took the threat seriously enough that they 
worked with Congress to pass the 1986 CFAA.43 Among other things, the 
CFAA criminalizes “unauthorized access” to a computer or the unauthorized 
“transmission” of malware (malicious software).44 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936. 
 40 See infra notes 41–93 and accompanying text. 
 41 See generally Amanda N. Craig et al., Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and 
Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 721 (2015). 
 42 See WARGAMES (United Artists 1983). 
 43 See, e.g., Michael S. Dorsi & Keenan W. Ng, Computer Criminal Intent, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 
469, 474 (2017) (“Congress passed the CFAA after legislators watched the movie WarGames.”); Obie 
Okuh, When Circuit Breakers Trip: Resetting the CFAA to Combat Rogue Employee Access, 21 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637, 646 (2011) (“Congress enacted the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, the CFAA precursor, in part due to the notoriety given to hackers in the 
1983 classic film [WarGames].”) (footnote omitted). 
 44 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018); see Jennifer Granick, Amendments to Computer Crime Law Are a 
Dark Cloud with a Ray of Light, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 15, 2009), https://www.eff.
org/deeplinks/2009/06/amendments-computer- [https://perma.cc/BWF7-28P2] (discussing the scope 
of the CFAA).  
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On its face, then, the CFAA would seem to deter hackers from targeting 
professional sports teams, their networks, and their trade secrets. Disagreement 
persists about the bounds of the CFAA, however, including its treatment of 
active defense.45 For example, could a team that has been hacked supposedly 
by a competitor engage in active defensive measures against the supposed per-
petrator, such as the Cowboys hacking back against the Patriots, as discussed 
in the introduction? Again, such a response would seem to run afoul of the 
CFAA, but questions remain over the interpretation of “unauthorized access” 
along with the likelihood of enforcement. The U.S. Department of Justice, for 
instance, has only gone so far as to call the practice “likely illegal.”46 Mean-
while, some critics contend that the CFAA bars organizations from responding 
to cyberattackers, even those located in foreign nations.47 Yet that has not 
stopped organizations from hacking back. For example, “[a]t the Black Hat 
USA security conference in 2012, [thirty-six] percent of respondents said they 
had engaged in ‘retaliatory hacking’ on at least one occasion.”48 
Historically, U.S. law enforcement has not looked favorably upon such a 
“vigilante view” of cybersecurity, with some indicating that the problem is too 
large for law enforcement to manage and that “problems still arise when com-
panies ‘get caught or when innocent bystanders are harmed.’”49 Attribution is a 
central, and challenging aspect of this problem. Richard Ledgett, the former 
deputy director of the NSA, has said “[a]ttribution is really hard. Companies 
have come to me with what they thought was solid attribution, and they were 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 1019 (2018) (“The 
CFAA also has attracted criticism from some commentators for its likely—though far from certain—
prohibition on the ability of private parties to ‘hack back’ against those that attack them.”); see also 
Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyber-
space, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 435 (2012) (equating “cyber counterstrikes” to “hack[ing] back”). 
 46 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BEST PRACTICES FOR VICTIM RESPONSE AND REPORTING OF CYBER 
INCIDENTS 12 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/speeches/attachments/2015/04/29/
criminal_division_guidance_on_best_practices_for_victim_response_and_reporting_cyber_incidents.
pdf [https://perma.cc/M37X-LKA5]. 
 47 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDER-
AL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 6–7 (2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-1025.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBN6-YG53]; Ellen Messmer, Hitting Back 
at Cyberattackers: Experts Discuss Pros and Cons, NETWORK WORLD (Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.
networkworld.com/article/2161144/hitting-back-at-cyberattackers--experts-discuss-pros-and-cons.
html [https://perma.cc/W582-NXCV]. 
 48 Craig Timberg et al., Cyberattacks Trigger Talk of ‘Hacking Back,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/cyberattacks-trigger-talk-of-hacking-
back/2014/10/09/6f0b7a24-4f02-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.html?utm_term=.2264a3e3d1d7 
[https://perma.cc/V6RQ-PGN2]. 
 49 Craig et al., supra note 41, at 732 (quoting Robert Anderson et al., Offense vs. Defense 1, 22 
(White Paper 2005), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4918/c5cf455fe22af1e342edfcf640d3b83687af. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ45-HVXX]). 
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wrong.”50 Stewart Baker, former assistant secretary for policy at the U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS), has asserted that defenders, for exam-
ple, who seek to reacquire data—including trade secrets—that were stolen 
without authorization might not run afoul of the CFAA prohibitions.51 Other 
commentators, such as Professor Orin Kerr, point out that the CFAA is focused 
on protecting the rights of computer owners, not data owners, and so the argu-
ment does not pass legal muster.52 Professor Kerr’s interpretation seems to be 
consistent with the majority view internationally, as seen in the Paris Call for 
Trust and Security in Cyberspace.53 In practice, however, Baker’s view seems 
to be winning out, given that, according to Ben Wittes of the Brookings Institu-
tion, “[a] fair bit of [hacking back] is going on. No one is saying it is OK. But 
no one is getting prosecuted for it.”54 
B. The Law of Trade Secrecy 
In addition to the computer-specific protections afforded by the CFAA, the 
law of trade secrecy also provides parties with protection from unauthorized 
cyber intrusion. Although definitions vary, a trade secret may be defined under 
American law as “any confidential business information which provides an en-
terprise [with] a competitive edge” and is not publicly known.55 Common exam-
                                                                                                                           
 50 Nicholas Schmidle, The Digital Vigilantes Who Hack Back, NEW YORKER (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/07/the-digital-vigilantes-who-hack-back [https://perma.
cc/28Z7-FW2F]. 
 51 Stewart Baker et al., The Hackback Debate, STEPTOE CYBERBLOG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.
steptoecyberblog.com/2012/11/02/the-hackback-debate/ [https://perma.cc/ZNL8-626C]. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See, e.g., Louise Matsakis, The US Sits Out an International Cybersecurity Agreement, WIRED 
(Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/paris-call-cybersecurity-united-states-microsoft/ [https://
perma.cc/4K5E-DRJW]. 
 54 Hannah Kuchler, Cyber Insecurity: Hacking Back, FIN. TIMES (July 27, 2015), https://www.
ft.com/content/c75a0196-2ed6-11e5-8873-775ba7c2ea3d [https://perma.cc/AR9Y-PFLU]. 
 55 What Is a Trade Secret?, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/
trade_secrets.htm [https://perma.cc/BG6W-XK7G]. Under U.S. federal law, trade secret is defined as:  
[A]ll forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engi-
neering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formu-
las, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or 
codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memo-
rialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if—(A) 
the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and 
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, 
another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the infor-
mation . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2018). 
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ples include formulas, sales methods, and industrial processes.56 Although na-
tions’ rules vary regarding the manner in which they protect trade secrets—with 
some providing express protection under their laws, and others merely protecting 
trade secrets under general laws governing unfair competition—the unauthorized 
use of trade secrets is generally regarded internationally “as an unfair practice 
and a violation of the trade secret.”57 As has already been noted, cyberspace 
permits the theft of trade secrets at a scale never before seen in human history. 
Some estimates have suggested that 5.2 trillion dollars in economic value is at 
risk of cyberattacks for the years 2019 to 2023.58 Although a staggering figure, if 
true, it becomes more believable when considering that the vast majority of the 
value of S&P 500 firms are now tied up in intangible assets, namely trade secrets 
and other intellectual property, as shown in Figure 1. 
                                                                                                                           
 56 The UTSA, which is generally followed by local authorities within the United States, defines a 
trade secret as information that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who 
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts 
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIFORM L. COMM’N 1985); see J.H. Reichman, Universal Min-
imum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agree-
ment, 29 INT’L LAW. 345, 378 (1995) (noting the UTSA “is widely adopted at the local level in the 
United States”). This definition is reinforced by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition Law, 
which defines a trade secret as “any information that can be used in the operation of a business or 
other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic 
advantage over others.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 
1995).  
 57 What Is a Trade Secret?, supra note 55. See generally, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., Using 
BITs to Protect Bytes: Promoting Cyber Peace and Safeguarding Trade Secrets Through Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2015). 
 58 See KELLY BISSELL & LARRY PONEMON, ACCENTURE SEC., NINTH ANNUAL COST OF CY-
BERCRIME STUDY 14 (2019), https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/pdf-96/accenture-2019-cost-of-
cybercrime-study-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RLF-DBTC]. Other estimates place the value of lost 
intellectual property at approximately $300 billion per year. See Reuters, Congress Just Passed Tough 
New Trade Secret Protection Legislation, FORTUNE (Apr. 28, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/
28/congress-trade-secret-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/PVJ8-V9UM]. 
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Figure 1: The Increasing Value of Intangible Assets59 
 
Given the potential value of these assets to the U.S. economy, a series of 
different legal protections have been promulgated at both the federal and state 
levels in order to deter parties from stealing one another’s trade secrets. 
1. Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
Dating back to 1979, the UTSA has historically provided the most im-
portant legal protection for trade secrets in the United States.60 Currently, the 
UTSA has been adopted in some form by forty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia.61 Meanwhile, the two remaining jurisdictions—New York and Mas-
sachusetts—have both adopted similar requirements for trade secret protection, 
despite not adopting the UTSA outright.62 
Under the UTSA, a trade secret is entitled to legal protection so long as it 
meets two requirements. First, the information63 in question must “derive[] 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Intangible Asset Market Value Study, OCEAN TOMO, http://www.oceantomo.com/intangible-
asset-market-value-study/ [https://perma.cc/37DF-GRD5]. 
 60 See Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 427, 432–33 (1995) (discussing the history of the UTSA). 
 61 See Lara Grow & Nathaniel Grow, Protecting Big Data in the Big Leagues: Trade Secrets in 
Professional Sports, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567, 1583 (2017). 
 62 See David Orozco, Amending the Economic Espionage Act to Require the Disclosure of Na-
tional Security-Related Technology Thefts, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 877, 889 (2013) (observing that alt-
hough New York and Massachusetts have not passed the UTSA into law, they have adopted laws that 
are similar in their effect). 
 63 Under the UTSA, “information” is defined broadly to include “a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). 
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independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other per-
sons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”64 Specifically, 
rather than require “absolute secrecy,”65 courts have instead interpreted this 
requirement to merely demand that the information sought to be protected has 
not “escaped into the mainstream of public knowledge.”66 
Second, a plaintiff pursuing a case under the UTSA must also show that 
the trade secret “is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.”67 Courts applying this requirement aim to 
strike a balance between enabling companies to use “sufficient precautions to 
protect a company’s secret on the one hand, while not imposing overly-
burdensome precautions that would impair the functioning of its business on 
the other hand.”68 Along these lines, companies “need not undertake ‘[h]eroic 
efforts’” to protect the secrecy of their information, but instead simply employ 
sufficient measures under the circumstances.69 Examples of sufficient reasona-
ble efforts may include utilizing electronic protective measures such as pass-
word protection and computer firewalls, along with more traditional options 
such as utilizing contractual provisions like non-disclosure and non-compete 
agreements.70 
Assuming that the two UTSA requirements are met, a company can then 
pursue legal relief against anyone who has misappropriated its trade secret. 
Under the UTSA, misappropriation can occur in one of two ways: (i) through 
the “acquisition of a trade secret . . . by improper means,” or (ii) through the 
knowing “disclosure or use of a trade secret” acquired by improper means.71 
The act defines “improper means” to include methods such as “theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain se-
crecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.”72 Should the plaintiff 
prevail in a misappropriation case under the UTSA, potential remedies include 
injunctive relief, damages for “both the actual loss caused by [the] misappro-
priation and [any] unjust enrichment” received by the infringer, along with pu-
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id. 
 65 Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets, 17 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (offering that it is well established that “reasonable efforts do not require absolute 
secrecy”). 
 66 JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 4.04(2)(a) (2017). 
 67 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii). 
 68 Rowe, supra note 65, at 9. 
 69 Grow & Grow, supra note 61, at 1586 (quoting Matthew J. Frankel, Secret Sabermetrics: 
Trade Secret Protection in the Baseball Analytics Field, 5 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 240, 253 (2012)). 
 70 See Frankel, supra note 69, at 253 (discussing potential reasonable measures). 
 71 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2). 
 72 Id. § 1. Notably, the law also “identifies actions that do not qualify as misappropriation, includ-
ing reverse engineering, observing the information in public display, and discovery by independent 
creation.” Grow & Grow, supra note 61, at 1592–93. 
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nitive damages and attorney’s fees in cases involving willful and malicious 
misappropriation.73 
2. Economic Espionage Act 
The 1996 enactment of the EEA marked the first attempt to federalize and 
criminalize the law of trade secrecy.74 The passage of the act was motivated by 
the fact that federal prosecutors had, at times, previously struggled to shoehorn 
the theft of a trade secret into other, more generally applicable laws—such as 
those prohibiting mail and wire fraud—as well as Congress’s increased con-
cern over foreign economic espionage.75 
Specifically, the EEA prohibits two different forms of trade secret theft. 
First, the law prohibits the misappropriation76 of a trade secret in order to ben-
efit a foreign entity.77 Second, the law criminalizes any domestic theft of a 
trade secret for economic gain.78 For purposes of both provisions, the EEA de-
fines the concept of a trade secret in a manner similar to that adopted in the 
UTSA.79 Specifically, the EEA requires that the information’s owner take rea-
sonable measures to keep it secret and that “the information derives independ-
ent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known.”80 
The EEA, however, diverges from the UTSA in several important re-
spects. For starters, in order to trigger liability under the EEA, the trade secret 
must be used in interstate or foreign commerce.81 Similarly, in contrast to the 
UTSA, the EEA also imposes a mens rea requirement by mandating a showing 
                                                                                                                           
 73 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3. 
 74 See Grow & Grow, supra note 61, at 1594. 
 75 See Kelley Clements Keller & Brian M.Z. Reece, Economic Espionage and the Theft of Trade 
Secrets: The Case for a Federal Cause of Action, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 8–12 (2013) 
(noting that pre-existing federal criminal statutes “were not designed to penalize trade secret theft,” 
before summarizing the legislative history of the EEA). 
 76 Specifically, the EEA defines misappropriation as an act involving one who: 
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by 
fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret; (2) without authorization copies, du-
plicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocop-
ies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade se-
cret; [or] (3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been 
stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1)–(3). 
 77 Id. § 1831(a). 
 78 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). 
 79 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4031 (“The 
definition of the term ‘trade secret’ [employed in the EEA] is based largely on the definition of that 
term in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”); see also Grow & Grow, supra note 61, at 1595 (noting the 
same). 
 80 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B). 
 81 Id. § 1832. 
488 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:473 
that the defendant acted with unlawful intent.82 Finally, unlike the UTSA—
which only applies in cases of actual misappropriation—the EEA “prohibits 
both attempted trade secret theft and conspiracies to commit misappropria-
tion.”83 
Those convicted of unlawful trade secret misappropriation under the EEA 
face a potential jail sentence of ten years in cases of domestic theft, or fifteen 
years for foreign espionage, along with maximum fines of five million dol-
lars.84 Meanwhile, an organization held in violation of the foreign espionage 
provision faces a fine of the greater of ten million dollars or three times the 
value of the misappropriated trade secret.85 
3. Defend Trade Secrets Act 
Finally, and most recently, Congress helped U.S. firms better protect their 
trade secrets through the passage of the DTSA in 2016.86 The DTSA was in-
tended to foster “uniform standards for what constitutes trade secret theft,” 
while also empowering aggrieved organizations to file civil suits in federal 
court.87 Technically, the DTSA amended the EEA to add a new federal civil 
cause of action for the misappropriation of a trade secret.88 As with the EEA, 
the DTSA similarly tracks the definition of a trade secret employed by the 
UTSA. The DTSA requires the trade secret owner to take reasonable measures 
to maintain the secrecy of its information, and that the information have “eco-
nomic value . . . from not being generally known.”89 Similarly, like the UTSA, 
the DTSA also defines misappropriation to include either (i) “the acquisition of 
a trade secret . . . by improper means,” or (ii) the “disclosure or use of a trade 
secret” acquired by improper means.90 
Where the DTSA diverges from the UTSA—and, for that matter, the 
EEA—is with respect to its ex parte seizure provision. Specifically, the act 
provides that under “extraordinary circumstances, [courts may] issue an order 
providing for the seizure of property necessary to prevent the propagation or 
dissemination of the trade secret.”91 In addition, unlike the UTSA, the DTSA 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 
317, 333 (2015) (“Unlike trade secret misappropriation under state law, the EEA demands proof of 
unlawful intent.”). 
 83 Grow & Grow, supra note 61, at 1596; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(4)–(5), 1832(a)(4)–(5). 
 84 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a), 1832 (a). 
 85 Id. § 1831(b). 
 86 Id. § 1836. 
 87 Reuters, supra note 58. 
 88 Grow & Grow, supra note 61, at 1597. 
 89 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). 
 90 Id. § 1839(5)(A)–(B). 
 91 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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also provides plaintiffs with access to the federal courts.92 Otherwise, the 
DTSA generally offers plaintiffs the same remedies that are available under the 
UTSA: injunctive relief and monetary damages.93 
As will be seen in the next section, teams belonging to the four major U.S. 
professional sports leagues possess an array of information that would qualify 
for protection under the various federal and state protections for trade secrets. 
III. POTENTIAL CYBER THREATS TO THE U.S. PROFESSIONAL  
TEAM SPORTS INDUSTRY 
U.S. professional sports teams have typically been quick to adopt emerg-
ing new technology,94 acquiring everything from iPads95 to wearable devices 
capable of biometric tracking.96 Despite their teams’ increased reliance on these 
devices, however, the leagues themselves have been relatively slow to develop 
rules regulating their teams’ use—and, perhaps more importantly, potential ma-
nipulation—of these emerging technologies.97 Indeed, there are a variety of are-
as in which teams could potentially seek to obtain a competitive advantage over 
their rivals through the manipulation of commonly used technology. 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study of the 
First Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 116 
(2018) (“From its inception, the DTSA allowed trade secret owners to bring a civil action in federal 
court for trade secret misappropriation.”). 
 93 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)–(B). 
 94 See Ben Sin, The NBA Is the Most Tech-Savvy Sports League in the World, and It’s Not Even 
Close, FORBES (June 2, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bensin/2016/06/02/the-nba-is-the-most-
tech-savvy-sports-league-in-the-world-and-its-not-even-close/#392f750657f6 [https://perma.cc/A4FB-
Q2U2] (observing that teams in the NBA have “long been forward-thinking and tech-savvy in every 
facet and on every level”). 
 95 See Stack, supra note 1. 
 96 See Kristy Gale, Evolving Sports Technology Makes Its Mark on the Internet of Things: Legal 
Implications and Solutions for Collecting, Utilizing, and Disseminating Athlete Biometric Data Collected 
Via Wearable Technology, 5 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 351 (2016) (“With respect to biometric 
data specifically, [new] technologies provide teams and leagues with more information about their play-
ers, ‘theoretically allow[ing] them to identify problem areas, improve more rapidly and avoid preventable 
injuries,’ says Alan C. Milstein, a leading bioethics attorney and sports litigator who often represents 
NBA players.” (quoting Eric Freeman, Has the NBA’s Biometric Data Tracking Boom Gone Too Far?, 
YAHOO SPORTS (Oct. 7, 2014), https://sports.yahoo.com/has-the-nba-s-biometric-data-tracking-boom-
gone-too-far-070039861.html?y20=1 [https://perma.cc/NR43-W2MC])); Rian Watt, New Technolo-
gies Are Forcing Baseball to Balance Big Data with “Big Brother,” VICE (May 27, 2016), 
https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/8qygbp/new-technologies-are-forcing-baseball-to-balance-big-
data-with-big-brother [https://perma.cc/98YR-55SC](discussing MLB teams’ use of wearable tech-
nology to measure the duration and quality of their players’ sleep). 
 97 See infra notes 148–177 and accompanying text. 
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A. Security of In-Game Technology 
The greatest area of potential concern for professional sports leagues is 
likely to be ensuring the security of the technology relied on by teams while 
competing on the playing field itself during the course of a game. Like most 
other areas of commerce, sports teams have increasingly digitized their work 
environments, with players and coaches now relying on technology to perform 
a variety of tasks. 
Perhaps most significantly, teams have increasingly utilized tablet com-
puters to take the place of more traditional hard-copy versions of their play-
books.98 Digitized playbooks offer teams several potential advantages over 
paper copies. Digitized versions are quicker and easier to modify. They allow 
players immediate and constant access to their coaches’ latest strategic plan-
ning, and provide teams with a potential cost savings of as much as $100,000 
per year in printing costs by dispensing with the need to reprint the playbooks 
on a daily or weekly basis.99 Digitized playbooks have also proven to be more 
secure than their hard-copy counterparts by not only enabling teams to utilize 
password protection but also allowing them to quickly erase a player’s team-
issued tablet computer immediately upon his being traded to another fran-
chise.100 At the same time, teams have used tablet computers to streamline oth-
er areas of communication with their players. For example, teams use the de-
vices to disseminate practice schedules and departure times for road trips.101 
Although certainly convenient, teams’ increased reliance on tablets also 
poses a host of potential cybersecurity threats. Even if the potential nightmare 
scenario discussed in the introduction above—for example, an NFL team gain-
ing access to its rival’s digitized playbook during the closing minutes of the 
Super Bowl—never emerges, teams could still gain any number of potential 
competitive advantages over their competitors by securing unauthorized access 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Gregory N. Hoole & Robert A. Bailey, The iPad and the Law, FED. LAW., May 2012, at 26 
(reporting that “the Tampa Bay Buccaneers became the first NFL club to discontinue the use of paper 
copies of playbooks; instead the team distributed its playbook and videos to all its players in electron-
ic format via an iPad”); see also Nicole Martinelli, iPad a Slam Dunk with NBA, CULT OF MAC (Apr. 
7, 2011), https://www.cultofmac.com/89516/ipad-a-slam-dunk-with-nba/ [https://perma.cc/B3A9-
98MT] (observing that “a number of NBA teams” are using iPads for everything “[f]rom playbooks to 
bus schedules”); Stack, supra note 1 (discussing NFL teams’ use of iPad playbooks). 
 99 See Ryan Faas, Why Most Teams Are Ditching Their Playbooks for iPads, CULT OF MAC (Sept. 5, 
2012), https://www.cultofmac.com/188847/why-most-nfl-teams-are-ditching-their-playbooks-for-ipads-
feature/ [https://perma.cc/C87G-U6E7] (noting that one NFL team reportedly spent over $100,000 per 
year printing over 100 copies of its playbook each week for its players and coaching staff). 
 100 See Joe Aimonetti, The iPad Has Revolutionized the NFL, CNET (July 18, 2012), https://
www.cnet.com/news/the-ipad-has-revolutionized-the-nfl/ [https://perma.cc/4HKN-M6QM] (“iPads 
can be remotely erased, even before a player realizes he has been released or traded.”). 
 101 See Martinelli, supra note 98 (“Our whole calendar is mapped out [on the team-issued iPads]. 
Guys can know when buses are leaving, when planes are leaving.”) (quoting then-Washington Wiz-
ards assistant coach Ryan Saunders). 
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to their rivals’ tablet computers. Pre-game access to a competitor’s playbook, 
for instance, could provide invaluable insight into the opposition’s strategic 
game plan. Meanwhile, teams could secure a potential competitive advantage 
by manipulating other franchises’ digitized practice or travel schedules ahead 
of key matchups. 
In addition to tablet computers, professional sports teams also rely on 
other potentially vulnerable technologies during the course of a game. In MLB, 
for example, teams are permitted to review a video replay before deciding 
whether to use their only opportunity to contest an umpire’s call on the field 
during a given game.102 These video signals could be used to interfere with the 
outcome of a game in several ways. 
Recently, for instance, the potential manipulation of these video replays 
was thrust into the spotlight when reports emerged that both the Houston As-
tros and Boston Red Sox—the 2017 and 2018 World Series champions, respec-
tively—had impermissibly used video replay feeds to decipher the signs used 
by the opposing team’s catcher to call each pitch.103 In the case of the Astros, 
players from the team then relayed this information to the batter at the plate in 
real time, via a series of whistles, claps, or banging of a trash can.104 Although 
the extent to which these schemes ultimately affected the outcome of the game 
on the field is unclear, they have nevertheless highlighted the potential impact 
that the manipulation of video replay systems can have on the integrity of the 
underlying competitions.105 
Alternatively, in the future, because MLB teams must decide whether to 
challenge a call within thirty seconds from the end of the play, a team could 
potentially delay or otherwise interfere with a rival team’s video replay signal, 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See Kenneth K. Kilbert, Instant Replay and Interlocutory Appeals, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 
292 (2017) (explaining that in MLB “[e]ach team’s manager now gets one challenge per game; that is, 
he may initiate instant replay review on one reviewable play per game,” and that “if the manager’s 
challenge is successful and the play is overturned, the manager retains the ability to challenge one 
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game”); see also A Guide to MLB’s New Expanded Replay Rules, CBS CHI. (Feb. 25, 2014), https://
chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/02/25/a-guide-to-mlbs-new-expanded-replay-rules/ [https://perma.cc/
XL39-D4Z9] (“A member of each team’s video staff can communicate his opinion of a call to his 
team’s dugout. Each team will have access to the same video feeds for review in any given ballpark. 
There will be a phone connecting the video room and dugout.”). 
 103 See, e.g., Nick O’Malley, Astros (and Red Sox) Sign-Stealing Scandal, Explained: How Did 
They Cheat? Why Is Alex Cora MLB’s Main Culprit?, MASS LIVE (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.mass
live.com/redsox/2020/01/mlb-sign-stealing-scandal-explained-what-did-astros-red-sox-do-to-cheat-
why-is-alex-cora-the-main-culprit.html [https://perma.cc/JB76-H33Z].  
 104 See Jacob Bogage, What Is Sign Stealing? Making Sense of Major League Baseball’s Latest 
Scandal, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/01/14/what-is-
sign-stealing-baseball/ [https://perma.cc/3UM6-AXRC]. 
 105 See Jake Mailhot, How Much Did the Astros Really Benefit from Sign-Stealing?, FANGRAPHS 
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://blogs.fangraphs.com/how-much-did-the-astros-really-benefit-from-sign-stealing/ 
[https://perma.cc/F7V9-ZE6Q]. 
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thereby providing the wrongdoer with a potentially critical competitive ad-
vantage.106 Similar concerns may also arise in the NFL, where teams some-
times rely on an assistant coach monitoring a video feed to decide whether to 
contest a particular call made on the field by a referee.107 
B. Security of Shared Data 
In addition to the technology relied on by teams’ playing and coaching 
staffs on the field during the course of a game, franchises in the four major U.S. 
professional sports leagues also rely on a plethora of shared data off the field in 
order to formulate strategies for upcoming games, make player personnel deci-
sions, and analyze potential trades. Thus, preserving the accuracy and reliability 
of this data is of increasingly critical importance for the sports industry. 
Perhaps most notably, the leagues recently began to employ new technol-
ogy to capture detailed data regarding the events that transpire on the playing 
field. Specifically, through the use of intricate camera and sensor systems, 
teams can now track and record every event that occurs during the course of a 
game.108 MLB teams, for instance, implemented a system called StatCast that 
can not only record every movement a player makes on the field, but also track 
the flight of the baseball itself. Moreover, StatCast can also capture the veloci-
ty at which a ball is hit or tossed, as well as the number of times it rotates after 
being thrown by a pitcher.109 Similar systems are installed in NFL stadiums110 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Manager Challenge, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/rules/manager-
challenge [https://perma.cc/5GNR-HLE8] (“A manager has a 30-second time limit to inform the um-
pire (by verbal communication or hand signal) whether he wishes to use his manager challenge to 
invoke replay review, and the challenge may not be rescinded once it has been exercised.”). 
 107 See John Kelly, How NFL Review Rules Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, https://entertainment.how
stuffworks.com/nfl-review-rules2.htm [https://perma.cc/9SYC-TYKQ] (noting that NFL coaches may 
“receive advice from an assistant coach in the booth who’s watching the network television feed”); 
see also Kilbert, supra note 102, at 287 (“[The NFL’s] current system allows each team’s coach to 
initiate instant replay review of two plays per game, with the potential of a third challenge if both of 
the earlier challenges are successful. Each challenge requires the team to use one of its timeouts. If a 
challenge is unsuccessful (i.e., the call on the field is not overturned), that team loses one of its 
timeouts. If a challenge is successful (i.e., the call on the field is overturned), the timeout is restored 
and no timeout is charged to that team.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 108 See Grow & Grow, supra note 61, at 1577. 
 109 See Michael Hattery, Comment, Major League Baseball Players, Big Data, and the Right to 
Know: The Duty of Major League Baseball Teams to Disclose Health Modeling Analysis to Their 
Players, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257, 265 (2017) (“The most recent collection breakthrough publi-
cized in 2015 incorporates radar technology with three high-definition cameras known publicly as 
Statcast. Their purpose is to collect three dimensional snapshots of every single movement that occurs 
on a baseball field in great detail, using roughly ‘40,000 frames per second converted [in]to digital 
data.’”) (quoting Bruce Schoenfeld, Can New Technology Bring Baseball’s Data Revolution to Field-
ing?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/magazine/can-new-
technology-bring-baseballs-data-revolution-to-fielding.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WQH7-A7C9]); 
see also Ben Lindbergh, Ready, Set, Statcast: What the New Data Stream Can Teach Us About MLB, 
GRANTLAND (Apr. 9, 2015), http://grantland.com/the-triangle/mlb-2015-statcast-advanced-hitting-
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and NBA arenas as well,111 with an analogous system scheduled to be imple-
mented by the NHL in time for its 2020 playoffs.112 The data recorded by these 
systems is then typically shared among all of the leagues’ teams. 
Teams are increasingly relying on the data produced by these systems to 
make a host of decisions. Most notably, the data produced by advanced track-
ing systems can be used to better assess a player’s physical abilities, data that 
not only helps inform a team’s decision on whether to acquire or trade a par-
ticular player but also how much money to offer the player during a salary ne-
gotiation.113 In addition, the data revealed by these systems can be used to help 
a team craft its in-game strategy, and allow clubs to pinpoint opposing players 
who may be moving a bit slower on the field in recent weeks, for instance.114 
As a result, sports teams could potentially obtain a competitive advantage 
by manipulating the tracking data that is captured by these systems. The pre-
cise mechanisms through which these data could be altered, and the extent to 
which they can be changed, will vary by league depending on the type of 
tracking systems used. Using MLB’s StatCast system as an example, it is theo-
retically possible that a team could seek to recalibrate the radar and high-speed 
cameras installed in their stadium in a way that would skew the resulting data. 
Because this radar and camera equipment is permanently installed in each 
team’s stadium, a team could presumably gain access to these devices relative-
                                                                                                                           
pitching-defensive-stats/ [https://perma.cc/QH28-3JRH] (explaining that StatCast “captur[es] the 
physical position of every player, pitch, and batted ball many times per second”). 
 110 See Kristy Gale, The Sports Industry’s New Power Play: Athlete Biometric Data Domination. 
Who Owns It and What May Be Done with It?, 6 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 7, 55 (2016) (“[T]he 
NFL already uses player-tracking data that includes, in part, athlete acceleration rate for its Next Gen 
Stats.”); Jessica L. Roberts et al., Evaluating NFL Player Health and Performance: Legal and Ethical 
Issues, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 246 (2017) (“Zebra is ‘The Official On-Field Player Tracking Provid-
er’ of the NFL.”); see also Kevin Clark, The NFL’s Brewing Information War, THE RINGER (June 2, 
2016), https://theringer.com/nfl-information-war-data-advanced-stats-73b6eee2d39f#.dl8hz9sfi [https://
perma.cc/3X6S-RB5A] (noting that the NFL’s tracking system “decipher[s] all movements on the 
field, measuring everything from player speed to how open a pass-catcher manages to get on a given 
play”). 
 111 See Christian Frodl, Commercialisation of Sports Data: Rights of Event Owners over Infor-
mation and Statistics Generated About Their Sports Events, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 55, 62 (2015) 
(observing that “[t]he National Basketball Association (NBA) announced an agreement with STATS 
in 2013 to install player-tracking systems at all NBA games”). 
 112 See Nicholas J. Cotsonika, NHL Expects Puck and Player Tracking to Be Ready for Playoffs, 
NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.nhl.com/news/nhl-optimistic-puck-and-player-
tracking-will-be-ready-for-playoffs/c-311467264 [https://perma.cc/8P5J-K9B8] (noting the tracking 
system “uses sensors in pucks and on players to create hundreds of data points per second” and should 
be ready for deployment “around the [2020] Stanley Cup Playoffs”). 
 113 See Bill Plunkett & Jeff Fletcher, Baseball 2016: Moneyball 2.0—Welcome to the Next Wave 
of Analytics, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.ocregister.com/2016/04/02/baseball-
2016-moneyball-20-welcome-to-the-next-wave-of-analytics/ [https://perma.cc/VGS4-VGKT] (stating 
that all MLB teams are “using advanced analysis [of StatCast data] to some degree in player evalua-
tion”). 
 114 See id. (reporting that StatCast data is “even [being used to formulate] in-game strategy”). 
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ly easily whenever it desires.115 Alternatively, a team could theoretically ma-
nipulate this data by intercepting it before it is transmitted to the rest of the 
league, or by accessing the league-wide server on which it is centrally stored. 
Either way, the offending franchise would then be in a position to adjust the 
resulting data accordingly when using it internally, while leaving the rest of the 
league to unwittingly rely on skewed data. 
In addition to the on-field tracking systems employed by the various 
leagues, the teams in each league are also increasingly sharing electronic med-
ical records for their players in order to help facilitate trades and other player 
transactions.116 In MLB, for instance, the league maintains a central database 
into which teams record any medical treatment the clubs’ training staffs pro-
vide to their players—all the way “down to hot tubs, aspirin and anti-
inflammatories.”117 Teams can then access the electronic medical records relat-
ing to an opposing team’s player during the final stages of discussion sur-
rounding a proposed trade to assess the current physical condition of the poten-
tial trade target(s).118 Similar systems are currently utilized by the other 
leagues as well.119 
As with the on-field tracking systems discussed above, this shared medi-
cal data is also a potentially attractive target for manipulation by teams. Most 
obviously, some teams may be incentivized to underreport medical treatment 
provided to their own players in order to mitigate any potential concern from 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See, e.g., StatCast, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/statcast [https://
perma.cc/6RFQ-H38W] (describing StatCast as consisting of “a combination of two different tracking 
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 116 See CHRISTOPHER R. DEUBERT ET AL., PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE HEALTH OF NFL 
PLAYERS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 62 (2017), https://football
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 118 See id. (“All MLB teams feed medical information into a central database known as the Sutton 
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 119 See Anne Zieger, NFL Uses eCW to Do Concussion Assessment, HEALTHCARE IT TODAY (July 
29, 2013), https://www.healthcareittoday.com/2013/07/29/nfl-uses-ecw-to-do-concussion-assessment/ 
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NBA announced that it was implementing Cerner’s EMR.)”). 
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their prospective trading partners.120 More nefariously, teams could even theo-
retically seek to modify the medical records relating to players on other teams. 
By fabricating additional, troubling entries in a particular player’s medical his-
tory, for example, a team could attempt to drive down trade interest in the 
player across the rest of the league, and thereby lower the price the offending 
team ultimately has to pay in order to acquire him. Alternatively, a team could 
even try to remove entries from an opposing player’s record in hopes of duping 
a rival into unwittingly acquiring an injured player. 
C. Security of Proprietary Databases 
In order to harness the increasingly large amounts of data that U.S. pro-
fessional sports franchises are accumulating from the advanced tracking sys-
tems discussed above121—and in an effort to centralize other, more traditional 
forms of data such as in-person scouting assessments and trade discussions 
with other teams—most teams have built their own internal, proprietary data-
base systems to help inform their personnel and strategic decision-making pro-
cesses.122 These databases represent a potential goldmine of information, as 
they document most of a team’s current internal thinking. By acquiring access 
to a rival franchise’s proprietary database, a team could thus discover a pletho-
ra of valuable information, including new methods of statistical analysis, the 
competitor’s trade strategies, and the players it is targeting in an upcoming 
draft.123 
Consequently, these internal, proprietary databases represent an extremely 
attractive target for potential cyber espionage. Indeed, in the professional 
sports industry’s most noteworthy cybersecurity breach to date, an executive 
from MLB’s St. Louis Cardinals accessed the proprietary database belonging 
to the rival Houston Astros—a system whimsically dubbed “Ground Con-
trol”—without authorization on a number of occasions throughout 2013 and 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Indeed, MLB’s San Diego Padres were accused of underreporting medical treatment in 2016, 
as discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes 198–202 and accompanying text (discussing the 
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 121 See supra notes 108–114 and accompanying text (describing tracking systems). 
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2014.124 Although the subsequent sanctions issued in the case of the Cardinals 
“hacking”—as discussed in further detail below125—will undoubtedly provide 
some deterrence against future breaches of this sort within MLB, these data-
bases, given their value, are likely to remain an enticing cyber-target for some 
rival executives in what is often a particularly cut-throat industry.126 
D. Security of Biometric Tracking Devices 
As noted above, professional sports franchises are increasingly utilizing 
wearable fitness-tracking devices to monitor their players in a variety of 
ways.127 Indeed, as one author recently noted, “[t]he use of biometric data in 
the sports industry is not new. Historically, teams have collected and used a 
wide variety of biometric and biomechanical measurements, including vertical 
jump, pitch speed, reaction time, heart rate, body composition, and self-
reported wellness information.”128 Today, however, emerging technologies en-
able teams to monitor their players in ever more detailed—and potentially in-
vasive—ways by allowing them to “measure the number of calories their play-
ers consume and burn in a given day, their heart rate during practice and 
games, and even the amount and quality of their sleep each night.”129 At the 
same time, other new devices—such as MotusTHROW130—let teams monitor 
their players physiologically in real-time during practices or games and detect 
the stress level that players are placing on various joints and tendons.131 The 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Plea Agreement at 7–8, United States v. Correa, No. 4:15-CR-00679 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 
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 125 See infra notes 179–187 and accompanying text. 
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2020] The Sport of Cybersecurity 497 
collection and use of such forms of biometric data is only expected to grow in 
the future.132 
Although much of the resulting data collected from these IoT devices is 
likely to be stored on the proprietary team databases discussed above,133 the 
biometric collection devices themselves represent a potential source of cyber-
security risk. By gaining unauthorized access to wearable devices used by the 
players on an opposing team, a franchise could potentially gain valuable in-
formation about its opponent’s players ahead of a key game. Knowing how 
well an opposing team’s players slept the night before, for instance, could al-
low a club to find a potential point of attack by repeatedly challenging an indi-
vidual who got less than the ideal amount of rest ahead of the game. Similarly, 
data regarding the stress levels that various players’ joints had incurred during 
recent practices could yield insight into which opposing players may be nurs-
ing an injury, and thus might be unable to perform at his or her highest level. 
E. Gambling-Related Concerns 
Finally, another area in which cybersecurity threats may endanger the in-
tegrity of a league’s games is the emerging sports gambling marketplace. Fol-
lowing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Murphy v. National Colle-
giate Athletic Association134—in which the Court struck down the Professional 
and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA),135 and thereby cleared the way 
for the legalization of sports gambling at the state-level—a number of new 
municipalities are expected to legalize gambling on professional sporting 
events in the coming years.136 
Legalized gambling could trigger a number of cybersecurity-related con-
cerns for professional sports leagues. With the advent of more widespread 
sports betting, leagues will need to invest resources to detect the potential fix-
                                                                                                                           
 132 See Joe Ciolli, Goldman Sachs: There’s a Fortune to Be Made Analyzing Sports Stats, BUS. 
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ing of matches.137 These efforts, in turn, will need to be protected against po-
tential unauthorized intrusions into the computer systems being utilized to help 
the leagues detect unusual betting activity. Similarly, with the leagues pushing 
for laws requiring betting houses to use official league-sanctioned statistics for 
their sports gambling outcomes,138 these efforts create the possibility that the 
leagues’ official statistics could themselves become the subject of a cyber in-
trusion.139 Indeed, even slight alterations of the official league records regard-
ing the outcomes on the playing field—such as the number of yards a running 
back rushed for in a particular football game—could yield significant profits 
for unscrupulous bettors. 
At the same time, leagues may also find it necessary to monitor for unau-
thorized betting-related activity occurring within their own stadiums. In pro-
fessional tennis, for instance, the men’s and women’s professional tours have 
been forced to monitor and ban the so-called practice of “courtsiding,” in 
which an audience member attempts to obtain a potentially critical informa-
tional advantage by using wireless communications technology to convey the 
results of a particular play to his or her betting associates.140 By obtaining im-
mediate notifications regarding the results of a play, these associates may be 
able to quickly place a bet on the results of the already completed play before 
the outcome is transmitted via television broadcast and the betting market is 
officially closed.141 
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 141 See id. 
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The same potential informational advantages are likely to materialize in 
the emerging betting markets relating to the four major U.S. professional 
sports leagues. Getting even a few seconds of advanced notice of the outcome 
of a critical fourth-down play in a professional football game, for instance, 
could enable a bettor to place a more accurate wager on the eventual outcome 
of the game. Deterring this sort of behavior within a team’s stadium is likely to 
require the implementation of various network-related cybersecurity protec-
tions, along with more traditional forms of visual detection. 
IV. LEAGUES’ CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER-RISK MANAGEMENT 
Although the trade secret protections outlined above in Part II.B putative-
ly apply to the U.S. professional sports industry, in reality teams are unlikely to 
directly rely on these laws to enforce their rights against their league rivals. 
Indeed, “[u]nder each league’s constitution . . . teams are generally prohibited 
from suing each other, or one another’s employees, in court. Instead, any dis-
pute between rival franchises and/or their employees is generally subject to 
arbitration before their respective league commissioner.”142 This reality makes 
the formulation and enforcement of league-wide policies governing trade se-
crets and cybersecurity all the more critical. 
Unfortunately, despite the multitude of potential cybersecurity threats af-
flicting U.S. professional sports teams, the four major leagues appear to have 
been relatively slow to address these possible vulnerabilities with specific 
league-wide rules or regulations. Although each of the four leagues was un-
willing to share any substantive details regarding its current cybersecurity pol-
icies,143 MLB reportedly relied on its teams to protect themselves from cyber 
intrusions, rather than impose any league-wide cybersecurity requirements on 
its franchises, as recently as 2015.144 Consequently, although the industry has 
only experienced one publicized competition-related cybersecurity breach to 
date—the “hacking” of the Houston Astros’ database by their MLB rival St. 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Grow & Grow, supra note 61, at 1617–18. 
 143 Specifically, MLB responded to an inquiry by stating that the league currently maintains a 
league-wide cybersecurity policy that applies to both the league office and all clubs, but was unwilling 
to share any additional details regarding the policy. See Email from Michael Teevan, Vice President, 
Commc’ns, Major League Baseball, to authors (Jan. 3, 2019, 11:12 EST) (on file with authors). 
Meanwhile, the NFL, NBA, and NHL either failed to respond to inquiries or declined to provide any 
information at all regarding their policies. See, e.g., Email from Tim Frank, Senior Vice President, 
Basketball Commc’ns, Nat’l Basketball Assoc., to authors (Jan. 2, 2019, 16:35 EST) (on file with 
authors). 
 144 Shaikin, supra note 5 (explaining that teams in the MLB are responsible for handling their 
own cybersecurity, though MLB experts are available for consultation). As noted above, today MLB 
maintains a league-wide cybersecurity policy that applies to both the league office and all clubs. See 
Email from Michael Teevan, supra note 143. 
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Louis Cardinals, mentioned above145—it is impossible to know whether other 
teams have simply failed to identify similar breaches to their own systems. In 
fact, the aforementioned Astros breach was only detected after the Cardinals’ 
employee responsible for the intrusion leaked a number of Houston’s internal 
team documents to the sports website Deadspin in 2014.146 
This makes the formulation of league-wide rules regulating cybersecurity 
all the more important. Unfortunately, although general provisions contained in 
the various league constitutions and bylaws could be used to penalize intra-
league cybersecurity violations, it is not clear that the existing penalty struc-
tures in place sufficiently deter this sort of activity.147 Indeed, prior cases in 
which leagues have punished teams for electronic-device-related breaches are 
likely to serve as key precedents, and thus limit the potential range of punish-
ment options available to leagues in these cases. 
A. Existing Applicable League Rules 
Although no league currently appears to have a rule in place directly regu-
lating cybersecurity breaches among their franchises, other, more generalized 
prohibitions could be used by the leagues to address future cyber intrusions. 
1. Major League Baseball 
Under the MLB Constitution,148 the league commissioner—currently Rob 
Manfred149—is generally empowered to investigate and punish “any act, trans-
action or practice charged, alleged or suspected to be not in the best interests of 
the national game of [b]aseball.”150 Should the commissioner determine that a 
team, or one of its officials or employees, have committed such an act not in 
the best interest of the sport, he may then assess one or more of a list of pre-
determined punishments on the offending club or person. Specifically, under 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text. 
 146 See Barry Petchesky, Leaked: 10 Months of the Houston Astros’ Internal Trade Talks, DEAD-
SPIN (June 30, 2014), http://deadspin.com/leaked-10-months-of-the-houston-astros-internal-trade-
1597951970 [https://perma.cc/9SM4-HNQF] (“Documents purportedly taken from Ground Control 
and showing 10 months’ worth of the Astros’ internal trade chatter have been posted online at . . . a 
site where users can anonymously share hacked or leaked information.”). 
 147 Of course, existing federal and state laws may provide additional deterrence. 
 148 MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, MAJOR LEAGUE CONSTITUTION (2005), https://ipmall.law.unh.
edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/League%20Constitutions%20&%20
Bylaws/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8MS-X6FK] [hereinafter MLB 
CONST.]. 
 149 See Rob Manfred, Commissioner of Major League Baseball, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 
https://www.mlb.com/official-information/executives/rob-manfred [https://perma.cc/XZ5L-3EYR]. 
 150 MLB CONST., supra note 148, at art. II § 2(b); see also Matthew B. Pachman, Limits on the 
Discretionary Powers of Professional Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of 
Issues Raised by the Pete Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1420–30 (1990) (discussing the 
scope of this so-called “best interests of baseball” power). 
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the existing league constitution, any fine issued by the commissioner is “not to 
exceed $2,000,000 in the case of a Major League Club, [and] not to exceed 
$500,000 in the case of an owner, officer or employee.”151 In addition, the 
commissioner may also suspend or remove the offending person from the 
league, withhold any other benefit afforded to the team or official under “the 
Major League Rules, including but not limited to the denial or transfer of play-
er selection rights” in the MLB draft, or impose any “such other [punitive] ac-
tions as the Commissioner may deem appropriate.”152 
In addition to this catch-all provision in the league constitution, MLB has 
also enacted a specific policy relating to the use of “Cell Phones and Electronic 
Devices In and Around [the] Clubhouse and On-field.”153 This policy generally 
prohibits teams from using “electronic equipment or devices . . . for the pur-
pose of stealing signs or conveying other information designed to give a [c]lub 
a competitive advantage,” while specifically prohibiting the use of “any type 
of walkie-talkies, mobile phones, ‘smart watches’ (e.g., Apple watches), laptop 
computers, tablets or other communication devices, in or near the dugout, in 
the bullpens or on the playing field” before or during a game.154 Violations of 
the policy “will subject both the [c]lub and offending individual to discipline 
by the Commissioner’s Office.”155 
2. National Football League 
As with MLB, the NFL Constitution and Bylaws also endow Roger 
Goodell, the league’s current commissioner, with relatively broad authority to 
investigate and punish any “conduct detrimental to the welfare of the [l]eague 
or professional football.”156 Specifically, under Article VIII of the NFL Consti-
tution, “the Commissioner shall have complete authority to,” among other po-
tential penalties, “[s]uspend and/or fine” any person or team guilty of conduct 
detrimental to the league “in an amount not in excess of five hundred thousand 
dollars ($500,000).”157 In addition, the Commissioner may “award selection 
choices and/or deprive the offending club of a selection choice or choices” in 
                                                                                                                           
 151 MLB CONST., supra note 148, at art. II § 3(a). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Major League Baseball, Cell Phones and Electronic Devices in and Around Clubhouse and 
On-Field (on file with author). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE art. VIII § 8.13(A) (2006), https://onlabor.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/co_.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S88R-52KE] [hereinafter NFL CONST.]; see also Michael Mondelli, The Roger Goodell 
Standard: Is Commissioner Authority Good for Sports?, 42 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 191, 200 (2017) 
(discussing the NFL Commissioner’s authority to punish “conduct detrimental to the league”). 
 157 NFL CONST., supra note 156, at art. VIII § 8.13. 
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the NFL Draft.158 Meanwhile, in cases where the Commissioner determines 
that the penalties above are “not adequate or sufficient, considering the nature 
and gravity of the offense involved, he may refer the matter to the [NFL’s] Ex-
ecutive Committee,” and recommend any other potential punishment “he 
deems appropriate.”159 
As with MLB, the NFL league rules also contain some specific provisions 
regarding the on-field use of electronic devices. Under Article IX of the NFL 
Constitution, teams are prohibited from using “any communications or infor-
mation gathering equipment, other than Polaroid-type cameras or field tele-
phones, including without limitation videotape machines, telephone tapping or 
bugging devices, or any other form of electronic device that might aid a team” 
during the course of a game.160 Meanwhile, aside from “[l]eague-issued Mi-
crosoft Surface tablets,” the league has enacted a specific Electronic Device 
Rule, which generally prohibits “the use of cellular phones, smart phones, tab-
let devices, computers, wearable electronic devices such as Google Glass, and 
other electronic equipment by coaches, players, and other club personnel” in 
any “club-controlled areas including, but not limited to, sidelines and coaches’ 
booths,” from “ninety (90) minutes prior to kickoff through the end of the 
game, including halftime.”161 
Finally, with respect to the league authorized tablet computers, NFL rules 
specifically prohibit teams from modifying their computers’ hardware or soft-
ware in any manner that might provide them with a competitive advantage.162 
Moreover, should a team’s tablet computers malfunction prior to the start of a 
game, league rules provide that the opposing team must also refrain from using 
its own devices until such time that both teams’ computers are in full working 
order.163 Importantly, however, if a team’s devices should malfunction after the 
game has begun, then the opposing team is not required to cease using its own 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at art. IX § 9.1(C)(14). 
 161 Mike Florio, Browns Apparently Violated Electronic Devices Rule, NBC SPORTS (Jan. 9, 2015), 
https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/01/09/browns-apparently-violated-electronic-devices-rule/ 
[https://perma.cc/8WE2-M8JH]. 
 162 See NFL Equity Rule, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, https://operations.nfl.com/the-rules/nfl-
equity-rule/ [https://perma.cc/D7JL-8HJE] (“The tablets, set up and maintained by league-employed 
purple hat technicians on game day, are configured so that clubs can’t modify them to gain an unfair 
competitive advantage. Attempts to alter tablet hardware or software without league approval are 
prohibited.”). 
 163 See id. (“If sideline or booth devices are not working properly at kickoff, the opposing team is 
limited to using only as many operational devices as the affected team has. For example, if one team 
has seven working devices in the bench area at kickoff, the other team is limited to using seven devic-
es in its bench area. When the malfunctioning devices are restored, both teams can resume using all of 
their devices.”). 
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devices.164 This rule creates a potential incentive for teams to manipulate one 
another’s tablets after kickoff. 
Moreover, in addition to the above limitations relating to the use of elec-
tronic devices, the NFL has also formulated a specific policy relating to social 
media usage by players, coaches, and team personnel.165 Under the policy, 
players, coaches, and other football operations personnel are prohibited from 
using social media from ninety minutes before kickoff until after the traditional 
post-game media interviews.166 
3. National Basketball Association 
Similar to his counterparts in MLB and the NFL, the commissioner of the 
NBA—currently Adam Silver167—is likewise granted broad discretion to adju-
dicate “matters that may adversely affect the Association or its Members.”168 
In cases in which a team employee has been found “guilty of conduct prejudi-
cial or detrimental to the Association,” the commissioner is empowered to 
“suspend [the individual] for a definite or indefinite period, [and/or] to impose 
a fine not exceeding $1,000,000.”169 Meanwhile, a specific provision in the 
league constitution governs cases in which confidential or non-public team or 
league information is disclosed for gambling-related purposes.170 In these cas-
es, the punishment for the disclosure of any “information concerning the medi-
cal, personal, or other condition of any Player, Coach, or Referee; any Player 
transaction; any disciplinary action taken or to be taken by the Association or a 
Team; and Referee schedules, assignments, statistics, and ratings,” is placed 
“within the absolute and sole discretion of the Commissioner and may include 
a fine, suspension, expulsion and/or perpetual disqualification from further 
association with the Association or any of its Members.”171 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See id. (“The equity rule no longer applies once the tablet systems are fully functional for both 
clubs, or once the game has started with full functionality.”). 
 165 See League Announces Policy on Social Media for Before and After Games, NAT’L FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d8124976d/article/league-announces-
policy-on-social-media-for-before-and-after-games [https://perma.cc/3PMJ-FP5R]. 
 166 Id. 
 167 See Adam Silver, NBA CAREERS, http://careers.nba.com/executive/adam-silver/ [https://
perma.cc/74GS-8XGM] (reporting that “Adam Silver was unanimously elected NBA Commissioner on 
Feb. 1, 2014, by the NBA Board of Governors”). 
 168 NAT’L BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS art. 24 § (e) (May 29, 
2012), https://ak-static.cms.nba.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/10/NBA-Constitution-By-Laws-
October-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC6M-X22P] [hereinafter NBA CONST.]; see also Zachary Stir-
paro, No Privacy for the Intolerant: A Reflection on Using an Illegal Recording of Donald Sterling to 
Set NBA Precedent, 13 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 17 (2016) (discussing the NBA Commissioner’s 
authority to punish wrongdoing). 
 169 NBA CONST., supra note 168, at art. 35A § (d). 
 170 See id. at art. 35A § (g)(ii-iv). 
 171 Id. 
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Moreover, as with the NFL, the NBA has also formulated a specific poli-
cy relating to social media usage by players, coaches, and team personnel. Un-
der the policy: 
[T]he use of cell phones, PDAs and other electronic communica-
tions devices—and thus accessing Twitter, Facebook and similar so-
cial media sites—is now prohibited during games for players, 
coaches and other team personnel involved in the game. The league 
has defined “during games” as the period of time beginning 45 
minutes before the opening tip and ending “after the postgame lock-
er room is open to the media and coaches and players have first ful-
filled their obligation to be available to media attending the 
game.”172 
This policy thus has the secondary effect of limiting team officials’ use of elec-
tronic devices for more potentially nefarious purposes. 
4. National Hockey League 
Finally, the NHL Constitution similarly grants the league commissioner, 
Gary Bettman,173 the power to resolve matters involving activity “that in the 
opinion of the Commissioner is detrimental to the best interests of the League 
or professional hockey.”174 As with the other leagues, in such cases the com-
missioner has the “full and complete authority to discipline” offending indi-
viduals through expulsion or suspension with fines not to exceed one million 
dollars, or in cases “affect[ing] the competitive aspects of the game, by award-
ing or transferring players and/or draft choices and/or depriving the offending 
Member Club of draft choices.”175 
Similar to the NFL and NBA, the NHL has also enacted a social-media 
policy, under which team executives are prohibited from using social media 
“beginning at 11 a.m. on the day of the game and ending after post-game me-
                                                                                                                           
 172 Marc Stein, NBA Social Media Guidelines Out, ESPN (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.espn.
com/nba/news/story?id=4520907 [https://perma.cc/L86T-QMTV]; see also SI Wire, Report: NBA 
Cracking Down on Players and Teams’ Social Media Conduct, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.si.com/nba/2017/02/09/nba-twitter-social-media-memo-update [https://perma.cc/5NHD-
4JML] (noting that the NBA continues to prevent “players from tweeting from 45 minutes before 
scheduled tip-off through when their media availability ends after games”). 
 173 See Kevin McGran, In His 25 Years as NHL Commissioner, Gary Bettman Has Been the Boss, 
the Villain and Many Things in Between, THE STAR (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.thestar.com/sports/
hockey/2018/01/31/in-his-25-years-as-nhl-commissioner-gary-bettman-has-been-the-boss-the-villain-
and-many-things-in-between.html [https://perma.cc/2QAF-AX6B]. 
 174 NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE art. VI 
§ 6.3(b)(5), https://www.lakelawgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/constitution-NHL-.pdf [https://
perma.cc/U7FK-6LPW]. 
 175 Id. at art. VI § 6.3(j)(1). 
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dia obligations,” with players’ usage similarly curtailed “beginning two (2) 
hours prior to the opening face-off and ending upon cessation of post-game 
media obligations.”176 Any violations of the policy are punishable via a mone-
tary fine.177 
B. League Disciplinary Precedents 
Although the authority granted to the commissioner of each league to in-
vestigate and punish activity not in the best interest of the league’s respective 
sport would seemingly give these individuals the power necessary to handle 
cybersecurity-related violations, in reality their discretion is more limited. 
When exerting their authority under their respective league constitution, com-
missioners will typically impose a punishment only after considering the ex-
tent to which parties have been penalized for wrongdoing in prior analogous 
cases.178 Consequently, the existence of relevant prior precedent may constrain 
the leagues’ ability to punish cybersecurity violations between teams. 
1. Major League Baseball 
MLB has dealt with several disciplinary cases in recent years that would 
likely serve as precedent for a potential cybersecurity-related infraction in the 
future. The most notable of these cases is, of course, the aforementioned 
“hacking” incident involving the Houston Astros and St. Louis Cardinals.179 
Specifically, throughout the 2013 and 2014 seasons, former Cardinals’ execu-
tive Christopher Correa illegally accessed the Astros’ internal computer net-
work and proprietary database.180 Correa was able to access the Astros’ system 
by using the old password of a former Cardinals’ employee who had gone on 
to work for Houston.181 The Astros eventually detected the unauthorized access 
                                                                                                                           
 176 Breaking Down NHL’s Social Media Policy, ESPN (Sept. 15, 2011), https://www.espn.com/
blog/nhl/post/_/id/11247/breaking-down-nhls-social-media-policy [https://perma.cc/8CDT-4LLR]. 
 177 Id. 
 178 See John Burritt McArthur, The Tom Brady Award and the Merit of Reasoned Awards, 8 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 147, 184–85 n.121 (2017) (noting the “law of the shop” doctrine general-
ly requires that league “rules and penalties are fair and consistent in the context of prior practices”). 
 179 See Associated Press, supra note 123 (describing the incident). 
 180 See Plea Agreement, supra note 124, at 7–8. 
 181 See id. at 8 (“Correa illegally accessed the Astros’ computers in the following way: In Decem-
ber 2011, as Victim A prepared to leave the St. Louis Cardinals and join the Houston Astros, he was 
directed to turn over his Cardinals-owned laptop to Correa—along with the laptop’s password. When 
Victim A joined the Astros, he re-used a similar (albeit obscure) password for his Astros’ e-mail and 
Ground Control accounts. No later than March 2013, Correa began accessing Victim A’s Ground 
Control and Astros’ e-mail accounts using a variation of the password to Victim A’s Cardinals lap-
top.”); see also Derrick Goold, Cardinals’ Pain Is Astros’ Gain as MLB Levels Penalties for Hacking, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.stltoday.com/sports/baseball/professional/
cardinals-pain-is-astros-gain-as-mlb-levels-penalties-for/article_bfe37c71-a48c-57be-98ed-1c5dec2
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after internal team documents were leaked to the website Deadspin in 2014.182 
This in turn prompted an inquiry by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.183 
Correa was ultimately prosecuted and—after pleading guilty to five crim-
inal charges—sentenced by a federal judge to forty-six months imprisonment 
and ordered to pay over $279,000 in restitution.184 MLB then elected to issue 
its own punishment in the case, with Commissioner Rob Manfred placing Cor-
rea on the league’s “permanently ineligible list,” which effectively banned him 
from the sport for life.185 In addition, Manfred decided that the Cardinals fran-
chise itself was “liable for the misconduct” of its former employee, and 
stripped St. Louis of its first two picks in the 2017 MLB Draft and awarded 
them to the Astros.186 Manfred also fined the Cardinals two million dollars—
the highest amount then allowed under the league constitution—and ordered 
the team to send the money to Houston as restitution.187 Thus, the Cardinals-
Astros affair sets a clear precedent for future cases of cyber-espionage involv-
ing MLB franchises. 
Meanwhile, in 2017, MLB investigated two separate incidents in which 
team employees were alleged to have engaged in the unauthorized use of elec-
tronic devices during the course of a game. The first incident arose after a se-
ries between the Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees, during which the 
Yankees believed Red Sox officials were improperly using an Apple Watch in 
the dugout to help steal New York’s signs.188 During the ensuing league inves-
tigation, Boston reportedly admitted that a member of its coaching staff had 
                                                                                                                           
eee93.html [https://perma.cc/Y7M5-FF98] (“Correa was able to use Mejdal’s password for ‘unfettered 
access’ to Houston’s data and Mejdal’s email.”). 
 182 See Petchesky, supra note 146 (discussing the leak of ten months’ worth of the Houston As-
tros’ internal trade discussions and the information contained therein). 
 183 See Michael S. Schmidt, Cardinals Investigated for Hacking into Astros’ Database, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/sports/baseball/st-louis-cardinals-hack-
astros-fbi.html?smid%3D=tw-nytsports [https://perma.cc/Z2PA-WZ4Q] (discussing an inquiry by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation into the hacking of the Astros). 
 184 Associated Press, supra note 123. 
 185 Goold, supra note 181 (“The commissioner placed Correa, who is serving a 46-month sen-
tence in federal prison, on the permanently ineligible list, effective immediately. That is the same list 
that includes others banned from baseball like Pete Rose and infamous members of the 1919 White 
Sox.”). 
 186 Id. 
 187 See id. (discussing the punishment Manfred levied on the Cardinals). 
 188 See Michael S. Schmidt, Boston Red Sox Used Apple Watches to Steal Signs Against Yankees, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/sports/baseball/boston-red-sox-
stealing-signs-yankees.html?smid=tw-nytsports&smtyp=cur&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/NUV3-8T7A] 
(“The Yankees, who had long been suspicious of the Red Sox’ stealing catchers’ signs in Fenway 
Park, contended the video showed a member of the Red Sox training staff looking at his Apple Watch 
in the dugout. The trainer then relayed a message to other players in the dugout, who, in turn, would 
signal teammates on the field about the type of pitch that was about to be thrown, according to the 
people familiar with the case.”). 
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improperly used an electronic device in the dugout.189 Due to the team’s can-
dor, MLB limited the punishment to a rather insubstantial monetary fine. Nev-
ertheless, MLB warned that future incidents along these lines would face much 
harsher sanction, including the loss of draft picks.190 
Several weeks later, the unauthorized use of an Apple Watch was once 
again in the news when Arizona Diamondbacks coach Ariel Prieto was spotted 
wearing the device in the dugout during a playoff game against the Colorado 
Rockies.191 MLB’s subsequent investigation later determined that Prieto had 
worn the watch inadvertently, and that it had not been used for any “baseball-
related communication.”192 Both Prieto and the Diamondbacks, however, were 
fined an unspecified amount due to their violation of the league’s electronic 
device policy.193 
Most recently, MLB announced in January 2020 that it was levying sev-
eral punishments against the Houston Astros for the team’s aforementioned 
sign-stealing scheme.194 Specifically, the league suspended both the team’s 
general manager, Jeff Luhnow, and its field manager, A.J. Hinch, for the 2020 
season.195 (Both Lunhow and Hinch were subsequently fired by the Astros for 
their involvement in the scheme.)196 The team also lost both its first- and sec-
ond-round draft picks in the 2020 and 2021 drafts, and was ordered to pay a 
five million dollar fine.197 
Finally, MLB was confronted with a case of alleged data manipulation by 
one of its clubs during the 2016 season. That summer, the San Diego Padres 
completed two mid-season trades—one with the Boston Red Sox and the other 
with the Miami Marlins—in which the club traded away pitchers who received 
medical treatment from the team’s training staff for various issues with their 
pitching arms.198 Neither the Red Sox nor the Marlins were informed about the 
                                                                                                                           
 189 See Marc Normandin & Whitney McIntosh, MLB Fines Both Red Sox and Yankees for Sign-
stealing Incidents, SBNATION (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2017/9/6/16262734/
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medical treatment ahead of the trade, and both complained to MLB that San 
Diego failed to disclose this relevant information.199 
A league investigation ultimately revealed that the Padres maintained two 
sets of medical records, one for internal use and the other to be shared with 
other MLB teams via the electronic-medical-records database discussed 
above.200 Although Padres officials insisted that they never intended to deceive 
anyone, the league nevertheless suspended the team’s general manager, A.J. 
Preller, for thirty days for his involvement in the incident.201 In addition, MLB 
helped broker an agreement between the Marlins and Padres under which the 
teams agreed to return some of the players they exchanged in the trade.202 
2. National Football League 
As with MLB, several prior incidents in the NFL also serve as potential 
precedents for any future cybersecurity-related disciplinary cases. First, in 
2006, Jim Mora, the then-head coach of the Atlanta Falcons, was caught using 
his cell phone on the sidelines during a late-season game against the Tampa 
Bay Buccaneers.203 Afterward, Mora explained that he was using the phone to 
call a team official to determine how a tie would affect his team’s playoff sta-
tus.204 Nevertheless, the unauthorized usage violated Article IX of the NFL 
Constitution, which prohibits the use of “any communications or information 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See id. (noting teams “were enraged by what they perceived to be strategic deception: veiling 
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Hits Mora with $25K Fine] (discussing the incident). 
 204 See id. (“Victories by the Cowboys and Redskins earlier that day meant that an Atlanta loss 
would eliminate the Falcons from the NFC playoff race, but Mora was unsure if they could remain in 
contention by tying Tampa Bay. He used a cell phone in an attempt to contact team officials and seek 
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gathering equipment . . . that might aid a team” during the course of a game.205 
As a result, Mora was fined $25,000 by the league.206 
Perhaps more notable, however, is the punishment the NFL doled out in 
response to the so-called “Spygate” affair in 2007.207 Specifically, during a 
game between the New England Patriots and the New York Jets, league securi-
ty officials confiscated a video camera used by the Patriots’ video assistant 
Matt Estrella while standing on the team’s sideline.208 The NFL’s subsequent 
investigation concluded that Estrella was using the camera to record the signals 
used by the Jets’ coaches to relay play calls to their players on the field. This 
constituted a violation of the league rule prohibiting the use of video-recording 
devices during the course of a game.209 
Commissioner Roger Goodell ultimately punished New England rather 
harshly, in no small part due to the fact that the NFL specifically warned teams 
about the unauthorized use of video cameras on the sidelines a little over a 
year before the incident after learning of earlier alleged video-camera-related 
infractions by the Patriots.210 Specifically, Goodell fined Patriots head coach 
Bill Belichick $500,000—the maximum allowable amount under the league 
constitution—along with a $250,000 fine for the team itself.211 In addition, 
Goodell stripped the team of its first-round pick in the 2008 NFL Draft.212 
Thus, the punishment issued in the Spygate incident likely serves as the most 
relevant precedent for future cases in which an NFL team gains a competitive 
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 211 See Belichick Draws $500,000 Fine, but Avoids Suspension, ESPN (Sept. 13, 2007), https://
www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=3018338 [https://perma.cc/Q94X-VN48] (“New England Patriots 
coach Bill Belichick was fined the NFL maximum of $500,000 Thursday and the Patriots were or-
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advantage over one of its rivals through the use of unauthorized electronic de-
vices on the field. 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This final Part explores the policy implications of the cybersecurity risks 
described in Part III, and the governance gaps revealed in Part IV. First, we lay 
out a theoretical lens through which to view next steps in enhancing the cyber-
security practices of professional sports leagues with a focus on the literature 
of polycentric governance.213 Next, we offer suggestions for how the sports 
leagues could better protect themselves from the existing competition-related 
cybersecurity threats.214 Finally, we highlight the potential role that govern-
ment—potentially both domestically (at the federal and state levels) and inter-
nationally—may play in helping to secure the integrity of the leagues and their 
games.215 
A. What We Can Learn from Using the Lens of Norm  
Entrepreneurs and Polycentric Governance 
One of the ways to consider the regulation of U.S. professional sports 
leagues generally, and the issue of cybersecurity in particular, is the dynamic 
field of polycentric governance—championed by numerous scholars including 
Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and Professor Vincent Ostrom216—in which 
multiple stakeholders “negotiate rules and policies to solve common prob-
lems.”217 This multidisciplinary approach has demonstrated the benefits of 
self-organization and networking regulations “at multiple scales.”218 It can, 
under certain circumstances, enhance “flexibility across issues and adaptability 
over time,”219 and can hasten the uptake of best practices that could generate 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See infra notes 216–231 and accompanying text. 
 214 See infra notes 232–249 and accompanying text. 
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positive network effects and result in the emergence of a norm cascade toward 
the Security of Things in professional sports.220 
The field of polycentric governance seems well suited to addressing the 
issues raised in this Article for at least two reasons. First, as has been noted 
here and elsewhere, the legal environment of U.S. professional sports leagues 
is fragmented, with the federal and state governments historically taking a 
hands-off approach to regulation in favor of the leagues managing their own 
conduct.221 There are some exceptions to this general rule, such as in the case 
of stadiums being public facilities and their resulting classification as critical 
infrastructure by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.222 Nevertheless, 
the fact that multiple stakeholders—discussed further below—are collaborat-
ing in governance at multiple levels highlights the links with polycentricity. 
Second, given the polycentric nature of the professional sports industry, 
Professor Elinor Ostrom’s design principles for institutional analysis are perti-
nent and can provide insights to franchise owners, players, and fans.223 These 
include the importance of: (1) “clearly defined boundaries for the user pool . . . 
and the resource domain”;224 (2) “[p]roportional equivalence between benefits 
and costs”;225 (3) “[c]ollective choice arrangements ensur[ing] that the re-
source users participate in setting . . . rules”;226 (4) “monitoring . . . by the ap-
propriators or by their agents”;227 (5) “[g]raduated sanctions” for rule viola-
tors;228 (6) “[c]onflict resolution mechanisms [that] are readily available, low 
cost, and legitimate”;229 (7) “[m]inimal recognition of rights to organize”;230 
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and (8) “governance activities [being] . . . organized in multiple layers of nest-
ed enterprises.”231  
Not all of Professor Ostrom’s design principles are applicable in this con-
text, given that cybersecurity is more of a public good than a common pool 
resource, but some do have salience, especially depending on the level of anal-
ysis undertaken. For example, they speak to the importance of having clear 
rules setting out escalating penalties for teams engaging in nefarious cyberse-
curity practices, and a robust monitoring and conflict resolution regime to en-
sure compliance to cybersecurity policies as is further discussed below. Other 
insights include the importance of setting adequate boundary conditions, the 
need for proportionality, ensuring a robust role for civil society (including fans 
and journalists), and effective monitoring. These insights are applied and fur-
ther unpacked in the following sections. 
B. Proposing an Updated Cybersecurity Policy for  
U.S. Professional Sports Leagues 
As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, protecting trade secrets, 
fans, and players from the array of cybersecurity threats faced by U.S. profes-
sional sports leagues is a multi-faceted and dynamic problem. As such, this 
Article asserts that leagues should take the lead in improving their cybersecuri-
ty and data privacy standards for franchises and fans. To date, rather than deal 
with cybersecurity issues in a proactive way, the four major U.S. sports leagues 
have unfortunately instead largely elected to adopt a reactive posture, choosing 
to deal with cyber breaches on an ad hoc basis once they are discovered. For 
instance, rather than establishing league-wide cybersecurity best practices for 
their teams, leagues generally defer to their franchises to protect themselves 
from cyber intrusions.232 Cases like the aforementioned hacking of MLB’s 
Houston Astros by the St. Louis Cardinals, however, highlight the need for 
more comprehensive, league-wide policies.233 
In all, we argue that five steps are warranted to help better secure the pro-
fessional sports leagues surveyed against the array of cyber threats they face. 
First, in an effort to put the principles of polycentric governance into practice, 
we argue that governance should happen at the level most appropriate to the 
envisioned harm. As such, any shared, league-wide systems necessitate league-
wide policies that the franchise owners would help fashion in order to ensure 
that cybersecurity best practices are deployed to help manage in-stadium play-
er tracking technology, injury-reporting databases, and gambling-detection 
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 232 See Shaikin, supra note 5 (citing an unnamed MLB official who stated that MLB teams are 
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 233 See supra notes 179–187 and accompanying text. 
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mechanisms. Such collaboration should be hastened by leveraging the new 
Sports ISAO discussed above.234 Moreover, this step echoes the third Ostrom 
design principle that good governance should take the form of defined user 
pools (e.g., professional sports franchises) practicing “[c]ollective choice ar-
rangements” that ensure “that the resource users participate in setting . . . 
rules.”235 
Second, although individual teams should continue to improve their own 
cybersecurity due diligence, best practices should be more easily shared 
through the Sports ISAO to ensure that the teams are implementing baseline 
cybersecurity standards such as the National Institute for Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework.236 A working group relating to the 
European Union’s recent General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) should 
also be established by the Sports ISAO to further this cause, and at the same 
time assist in the international expansion plans for U.S. professional sports 
leagues.237 The leagues could also go further and establish a joint Security Op-
erations Center (SOC) similar to that created by the financial sector to help 
improve the cybersecurity standards of its constituents.238 
Third, again building off of the Ostrom design principles discussed above 
relating to the importance of graduated sanctions,239 we recommend that 
league rules be formulated for data breaches with escalating penalties depend-
ing on the nature of the infraction, while also taking into consideration that a 
breach between two teams has ramifications for the entire league.240 These best 
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practices should incorporate, to the extent possible, GDPR standards discussed 
further below, such as establishing a 72-hour data breach notification window 
along with the right of data portability and heightened consent requirements, 
especially for sensitive data. We note that, in some cases, the formulation of 
new, sufficiently punitive league rules may require amending the respective 
league’s constitution to provide for higher maximum fine amounts to help in-
centivize the uptake of these best practices.241 
Fourth, it is imperative for the leagues to work to protect the biometric 
data they collect via tracking devices, and to help ensure that players are pro-
tecting their own data responsibly. To accomplish these feats, the leagues 
should establish mandatory (and regularly audited) cybersecurity hygiene pro-
grams that include penetration testing and anti-phishing initiatives. Further, the 
leagues should proactively implement cybersecurity best practices related to IoT 
security, such as requiring NIST Cybersecurity Framework compliance from 
vendors and suppliers.242 To this end, the leagues could take the affirmative step 
of launching a bug-bounty competition of the kind that many private and public-
sector organizations—including Microsoft and the Department of Homeland 
Security—have already announced, to help shore up vulnerabilities.243 
Fifth and finally, we recommend that leagues consider moving to an inde-
pendent arbitration system for cybersecurity-related disputes, rather than rely-
ing on the league commissioner to serve as arbitrator in these cases.244 Indeed, 
arbitration-by-commissioner has previously resulted in allegations of bias, with 
many fans believing that a particular league’s commissioner was predisposed 
to rule in favor of a team with a particularly influential owner, because these 
owners will, to a large extent, determine whether the league will ultimately 
elect to renew the commissioner’s contract.245 This, again, implicates an 
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Ostrom design principle—low-cost, effective dispute resolution.246 We further 
recommend that the findings of these arbitral panels be made available 
throughout the leagues to help build precedent and fill in cybersecurity gov-
ernance gaps that are still apparent in the existing frameworks. 
It should be noted that, in some cases, these issues may require leagues to 
reach agreement with their applicable players’ union. As discussed above, sev-
eral existing cyber threats—including the use of biometric-tracking devices 
and the storage of electronic medical records—directly implicate data relating 
to, and collected from, players. Consequently, any new league policies in these 
areas will likely have to be subjected to union approval via the collective-
bargaining process.247 Indeed, both MLB’s and the NBA’s most recent collec-
tive bargaining agreements specifically discuss the permissible use of bio-
metric-tracking devices on the playing field.248 The players’ amenability to 
reach agreement with the leagues on these matters is uncertain, as in some cas-
es players are independently seeking to monetize their biometric data them-
selves.249 Nevertheless, given the potential ramifications of a cyber breach in 
this area, leagues should make a concerted effort to reach an agreement with 
the players and their unions on these matters. 
C. A Potential Government Solution for U.S. Professional  
Sports Leagues’ Cybersecurity Risks 
Should owners fail to develop sufficient cybersecurity policies inde-
pendently, it is possible that government may eventually consider stepping in 
to fill the void. This could take the form of the federal government taking steps 
to protect teams’ trade secrets, along with their stadiums and practice facilities, 
as was described in Part I. Such steps are politically difficult, given the long 
history of Congressional resistance to ‘comprehensive’ cybersecurity reform 
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efforts—as the history of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 can attest250—as well 
as the federal government’s general reluctance to regulate the sports indus-
try.251 Nevertheless, a high-profile incident—such as a cyberattack on a major 
sporting event such as the Super Bowl or either the Olympics or World Cup, 
both of which the United States will host in the 2020s252—could change the 
political calculus.253 
Perhaps more likely, then, is that teams may inadvertently be swept up by 
other, more general cybersecurity regulations enacted at the federal or state 
levels. For example, as with its groundbreaking 2002 privacy law that ushered 
in the first data-breach notification standards—an idea that has since been cop-
ied by the other forty-nine states—California’s 2018 Consumer Privacy Act is 
helping to set a new standard for U.S. privacy protections.254 Given the number 
of teams operating in the state, California’s new law thus has potentially signif-
icant ramifications for the U.S. professional sports industry. Although it does 
not go quite as far as the EU’s GDPR, it does include provisions that allow 
consumers to sue over data breaches, and decide when, and how, their data is 
being gathered and used by companies like Facebook and Google.255 Although 
there remains debate about the scope and effectiveness of this intervention,256 
the law may well help shape the cybersecurity practices of professional sports 
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leagues in California, such as by requiring added efforts to protect the privacy 
rights of players and fans. An accounting of state-level cybersecurity laws as of 
July 2018 is included in Table 1. 
Table 1: Status of State-Level Cybersecurity Laws257 
Type of State Law Coverage Description 
Hacking, Unauthorized 
Access, Computer Tres-
pass, Viruses, Malware 
All 50 States All fifty states have 
enacted laws that gen-
erally prohibit actions 
that interfere with 
computers, systems, 
programs, or networks. 
Data Breach Notifica-
tion Laws 
All 50 States  
Anti-Phishing Laws 23 States: Alabama, 
Arkansas, Arizona, Cal-
ifornia, Connecticut, 
Florida, Georgia, Illi-
nois, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Montana, New 
Mexico, New York, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Tennes-
see, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia and Washington, 
as well as Guam 
A total of twenty-three 
states and Guam have 
enacted laws targeting 
phishing schemes. 
Many other states have 
laws concerning decep-
tive practices or identi-
ty theft that may also 
apply to phishing 
crimes. 
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Anti-Denial of Ser-
vice/DDoS Laws 
25 States: Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Cal-
ifornia, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennes-
see, Virginia, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming 
 
Anti-Spyware Laws 20 States: Alaska, Ari-
zona, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New 
York, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Wash-
ington, and Wyoming, 
as well as Guam, and 
Puerto Rico 
Twenty states and two 
U.S. territories have 
laws expressly prohibit-
ing use of spyware. 
Other state laws against 
deceptive practices, 
identity theft, or com-
puter crimes in general 
may be applicable to 
crimes involving spy-
ware. 
Anti-Ransomware 
Laws/Computer Extor-
tion Laws 
5 States: California, 
Connecticut, Michigan, 
Texas, and Wyoming 
Currently five states 
have statutes that ad-
dress ransomware, or 
computer extortion; 
however, other state 
laws prohibiting mal-
ware and computer 
trespass may be used to 
prosecute these crimes 
as well. 
Two regulatory trends are also relevant to discuss with regards to the cy-
bersecurity of U.S. professional sports leagues: active defense and internation-
al cybersecurity standards. First is the current debate—referenced above258—to 
allow organizations to engage in active defense measures, up to and including 
                                                                                                                           
 258 See supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text. 
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‘hacking back,’ if their intellectual property has been compromised. Although 
this idea has long been a relatively fringe concept, it is getting more main-
stream attention, even rising to the level of being included in the 2016 Repub-
lican National Committee (RNC) platform.259 As noted above, according to the 
Department of Justice, this practice is “likely illegal” under the CFAA at the 
federal level,260 as well as at the state level as illustrated in Table 1. Neverthe-
less, there are efforts currently at the federal and state levels to change the sta-
tus quo. Specifically, the Active Cyber Defense Certainty (ACDC) Act would 
permit organizations to operate beyond their network perimeter, including the 
potential to conduct surveillance on entities “who are thought to have done 
hacking in the past or who, according to a tip or some other intelligence, are 
planning an attack.”261 The bill also clarifies “the type of tools and techniques 
that defenders can use that exceed the boundaries of their own computer net-
work.”262 In particular, it specifies that people facing criminal charges under 
the CFAA for illegal hacking can defend themselves by claiming that their ac-
tivities were “active cyber defense measures.”263 If passed, this could permit 
teams to “hack back” at opposing teams or other entities that compromise their 
networks. Similarly, Georgia’s State Bill 315, which passed in May 2018, per-
mitted “active defense measures that are designed to prevent or detect unau-
thorized computer access” until Governor Nathan Deal vetoed the bill due to 
its “national security implications and other potential ramifications.”264 
Such measures could have particular salience in the U.S. professional 
sports industry. Because executives often frequently move between franchises 
in a particular league,265 teams may worry that their former employees will 
wrongly take their former club’s intellectual property to their new employer. 
This was the stated motivation behind the former St. Louis Cardinals’ execu-
tive’s hacking into the Houston Astros’ computer system in 2013 and 2014, for 
                                                                                                                           
 259 See Paul Szoldra, This One Sentence in the GOP Platform Has Cybersecurity Experts Freak-
ing Out, BUS. INSIDER (July 21, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/gop-platform-hacking-back-
2016-7?pundits_only=0&get_all_comments=1&no_reply_filter=1 [https://perma.cc/PQ5C-5JFH]. 
 260 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 12. 
 261 Schmidle, supra note 50. 
 262 Josephine Wolff, Attack of the Hack Back, SLATE (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.slate.com/
articles/technology/future_tense/2017/10/hacking_back_the_worst_idea_in_cybersecurity_rises_again.
html [https://perma.cc/S6F9-ZRED]. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Tara Seals, Georgia Governor Vetoes Controversial Hack-Back Bill, THREATPOST (May 9, 
2018), https://threatpost.com/georgia-governor-vetoes-controversial-hack-back-bill/131822/ [https://
perma.cc/25AW-2DCT]. 
 265 Cf. Grow & Grow, supra note 61, at 1610 (observing that due to the fact that “the potential 
universe of qualified applicants for many of the vacancies that a sports team may need to fill can often 
be quite small” teams depend on outside hiring to find qualified “coaches, scouts, or front office per-
sonnel”). 
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instance.266 Should such active defense measures be legalized at the state or 
federal level, sports teams may seek to utilize these protections in order to de-
fend their intellectual property from perceived infringement. This possibility 
further highlights the need for leagues to adopt proactive measures regulating 
their teams in this regard. 
Second, as U.S. professional sports leagues look to expand their opera-
tions abroad,267 they should be cognizant of new regulatory requirements, par-
ticularly in the EU. Indeed, these laws have already been called a “game 
changer” for European sports leagues.268 Generally, GDPR is an expansive 
regulatory regime with a wide array of requirements on covered firms, ranging 
from ensuring data portability and consent to mandating that firms disclose a 
data breach within seventy-two hours of becoming aware of the incident and 
conduct a post mortem to ensure that it will not recur.269 GDPR is particularly 
relevant to professional sports leagues due to its provisions regarding data 
portability. Under GDPR, players, staff, fans, and volunteers may now be al-
lowed to request their data, and have it deleted, while franchises may have to 
transfer proprietary data regarding their former players to their new team fol-
lowing a trade.270 Although a full accounting of the potential implications of 
GDPR for the U.S. professional sports industry is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle, the bottom line is that U.S.-based leagues considering expansion oppor-
                                                                                                                           
 266 See Chris Correa Still Alleges Astros First Stole Information from Cardinals, ESPN (Jan. 31, 
2017), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/18592311/chris-correa-maintains-allegations-houston-
astros-first-stole-information-st-louis-cardinals [https://perma.cc/SM2S-2DQV] (reporting that Chris-
topher Correa claimed that “the Astros were the team that first stole information,” with Correa having 
released a statement asserting “[o]n December 21, 2011, a Houston Astros employee accessed pro-
prietary data on a St. Louis Cardinals server” and that “[l]ater, I would learn—through unlawful 
methods—that Cardinals’ data were used extensively from 2012 through 2014”). 
 267 The NFL, for instance, has been staging regular-season games in London for years, with an eye 
towards establishing a full-time franchise in the city as soon as 2022. See Albert Breer, Game Plan: NFL 
Believes London Is Ready for Team; 2022 Target is Doable, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/09/21/nfl-london-team-international-series-europe-football [https://perma.
cc/2AXB-YZYZ] (noting that the NFL’s International Series began in 2007, with the ultimate goal of 
having “a team in London at the International Series’ 15-year mark”). Likewise, MLB held a series of 
games between the Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees in London in 2019, while the NBA and 
NHL teams have held games in Europe for years. See Matthew Engel, London’s MLB Crowd Offers 
Baseball a New Land of Opportunity, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
sport/blog/2019/jul/01/london-mlb-red-sox-yankees [https://perma.cc/BYR6-LHCJ] (discussing the two 
game series between the Red Sox and Yankees); History of the NBA Global Games, NAT’L BASKETBALL 
ASS’N, https://www.nba.com/global/games2013/all-time-international-game-list.html [https://perma.
cc/E794-H9WB]; NHL Overseas History, NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.nhl.
com/news/history-of-international-nhl-games/c-559166 [https://perma.cc/K2AB-ZN46]. 
 268 Trev Keane, New Data Regulations Will Be a Game-Changer for Sport, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 
25, 2018), https://www.independent.ie/sport/new-data-regulations-will-be-a-gamechanger-for-sport-
36741211.html [https://perma.cc/5C4L-BC2T]. 
 269 See, e.g., Top Ten Operational Impacts of the GDPR, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROF., https://
iapp.org/resources/article/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/9L26-S52M]. 
 270 See Keane, supra note 268. 
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tunities to Europe need to put into place GDPR security and privacy require-
ments like many U.S. firms are already doing, lest they run the risk of running 
afoul of GDPR penalties, which can range up to four percent of an organiza-
tion’s total global revenue.271 
CONCLUSION 
There is a long history of U.S. professional sports leagues rallying to en-
sure the integrity of their respective games from threats as diverse as illegal 
gambling to doping. So far, though, as this Article has shown, these same 
leagues do not appear to be doing enough to protect their franchises, players, 
and fans from the array of cyber threats threatening the integrity of their 
games. Moving forward, a polycentric approach that includes franchise own-
ers, players unions, and federal and state-level policymakers is essential to has-
ten the uptake of baseline cybersecurity standards and to eventually get ahead 
of the curve by taking steps such as implementing GDPR requirements global-
ly. These measures are essential to protect the sports and players we love from 
abuses, both online and offline, a topic that that is now more important and 
more timely than ever as the Internet of Everything expands. 
                                                                                                                           
 271 See Michelle Drolet, GDPR Fines: How Much Will Non-Compliance Cost You?, CSO (Oct. 
23, 2017), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3234685/data-protection/gdpr-fines-how-much-will-
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